The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

Now the conceptions whose observed incongruity with the perceptions moves us to laughter are either those of others or our own. In the first case we laugh at others, in the second we feel a surprise, often agreeable, at the least amusing. Therefore children and uneducated people laugh at the most trifling things, even at misfortunes, if they were unexpected, and thus convicted their preconceived conception of error.

As a rule laughing is a pleasant condition ; accordingly the apprehension of the incongruity between what is thought and what is perceived, that is, the real, gives us pleasure, and we give ourselves up gladly to the spasmodic convulsions which this apprehension excites. The reason of this is as follows.

In every suddenly appearing conflict between what is perceived and what is thought, what is perceived is always unquestionably right ; for it is not subject to error at all, requires no confirmation from without, but answers for itself. Its conflict with what is thought springs ultimately from the fact that the latter, with its abstract conceptions, cannot get down to the infinite multifariousness and ine shades of difference of the concrete.

This victory of knowledge of perception over thought affords us pleasure. ?or perception is the original kind of knowledge insepar28o FIRST BOOK. CHAPTER VI IT.

able from animal nature, in which everything that gives direct satisfaction to the will presents itself. It is the medium of the present, of enjoyment and gaiety ; moreover it is attended with no exertion. With thinking the opposite is the case ; it is the second power of knowledge, the exercise of which always demands some, and often considerable, exertion. Besides, it is the conceptions of thought that often oppose the gratification of our immediate desires, for, as the medium of the past, the future, and of seriousness, they are the vehicle of our fears, our repentance, and all our cares. It must therefore be diverting to us to see this strict, untiring, troublesome governess, the reason, for once convicted of insufficiency. On this account then the mien or appearance of laughter is very closely related to that of joy.

On account of the want of reason, thus of general conceptions, the brute is incapable of laughter, as of speech. This is therefore a prerogative and characteristic mark of man. Yet it may be remarked in passing that his one friend the dog has an analogous characteristic action peculiar to him alone in distinction from all other brutes the very expressive, kindly, and thoroughly honest fawninc and wagging of its tail But how favourably does thi salutation given him by nature compare with the bow? and simpering civilities of men. At least for the present it is a thousand times more reliable than their assurance of inward friendship and devotion.

The opposite of laughing and joking is seriousnesi Accordingly it consists in the consciousness of the perfec agreement and congruity of the conception, or thoughl with what is perceived, or the reality. The serious mai is convinced that he thinks the things as they are, an that they are as he thinks them. This is just why th transition from profound seriousness to laughter is so eas} and can be effected by trifles. For the more perfect ths agreement assumed by seriousness may seem to be, th more easily is it destroyed by the unexpected discoverp. 281 of even a slight incongruity. Therefore the move a man is capable of entire seriousness, the more heartily can he laugh. Men whose laughter is always affected and forced are intellectually and morally of little worth ; and in general the way of laughing, and, on the other hand, the occasions of it, are very characteristic of the person. That the relations of the sexes afford the easiest materials for jokes always ready to hand and within the reach of the weakest wit, as is proved by the abundance of obscene jests, could not be if it were not that the deepest seriousness lies at their foundation.