The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
Wisdom and genius, these two summits of the Parnassus of human knowledge, have their foundation not in the abstract and discursive, but in the perceptive faculty. Wisdom proper is something intuitive, not something abstract It does not consist in principles and thoughts, which one can carry about ready in his mind, as results of his own research or that of others ; but it is the whole manner in which the world presents itself in his mind. This varies so much that on account of it the wise man lives in another world from the fool, and the genius sees another world from the blockhead. That the works of the man of genius immeasurably surpass those of all others arises simply from the fact that the world which he sees, and from which he takes his utterances, is so much clearer, as it were more profoundly worked out, than that in the minds of others, which certainly contains the same objects, but is to the world of the man of genius as the Chinese picture without shading and perspective is to the finished oil-painting. The material is in all minds the same ; but ; the difference lies in the perfection of the form which it assumes in each, upon which the numerous grades of intelligence ultimately depend. These grades thusp. 250 exist in the root, in the perceptive or intuitive appre* hension, and do not first appear in the abstract Hence original mental superiority shows itself so easily when the occasion arises, and is at once felt and hated by others.
In practical life the intuitive knowledge of the understanding is able to guide our action and behaviour directly, while the abstract knowledge of the reason can only do so by means of the memory. Hence arises the superiority of intuitive knowledge in all cases which admit of no time , for reflection ; thus for daily intercourse, in which, just on this account, women excel.
Only those who intuitively know the nature of men as they are as a rule, and thug comprehend the individuality of the person before them, will understand how to manage him with certainty and rightly. Another may know by heart all the three hundred maxims of Gracian, but this will not save him from stupid mistakes and misconceptions if he lacks that intuitive knowledge.
For all abstract knowledge affords us primarily mere general principles and rules ; but the particular case is almost never to be carried out exactly according to the rule ; then the rule itself has to be presented to us at the right time by the memory, which seldom punctually happens ; then the propositio minor has to be formed out of the present case, and finally the conclusion drawn.
Before all this is done the opportunity has generally turned its back upon us, and then those excellent principles and rules serve at the most to enable us to measure the magnitude of the error we have committed. Certainly with time we gain in this way experience and practice, which slowly grows to knowledge of the world, and thus, in connection with this, the abstract rules may certainly become fruitful.
On the other hand, the intuitive knowledge, which always apprehends only the particular, stands in immediate relation to the present case. ReJe, case, and application are for it one, and action follows immediately upon it. This explains why in real life the scholar, whose pre-eminence lies in the province of abstract knowledge, is so far surpassed by the man of the world, whose pre-eminence consists in perfect intuitive knowledge, which original disposition conferred on him, and a rich experience has developed.
The two kinds of knowledge always stand to each other in the relation of paper money and hard cash ; and as there are many cases and circumstances in which the former is to be preferred to the latter, so there are also things and situations for which abstract knowledge is more useful than intuitive.
If, for example, it is a conception that in some case guides our action, when it is once grasped it has the advantage of being unalterable, and therefore under its guidance we go to work with perfect certainty and consistency. But this certainty which the conception confers on the subjective side is outweighed by the uncertainty which accompanies it on the objective side.
The whole conception may be false and groundless, or the object to be dealt with may not come under it, for it may be either not at all or not altogether of the kind which belongs to it. Now if in the particular case we suddenly become conscious of something of this sort, we are put out altogether ; if we do not become conscious of it, the result brings it to light.
Therefore Vauvenargue says: "Personne riest sujet a plus def aides, que ceux qui n'agissent que par reflexion" If, on the contrary, it is direct perception of the objects to be dealt with and their relations that guides our action, we easily hesitate at every step, for the perception is always modifiable, is ambiguous, has inexhaustible details in itself, and shows many sides in succession ; we act therefore without full confidence.
But the subjective uncertainty is compensated by the objective certainty, for here there is no conception between the object and us, we never lose sight of it ; if therefore we only see correctly what we have before us and what we do, we shall hit the mark. Our action then is perfectly sure only when it is guided by a conception the right ground of which, its completeness, and applica252 FIRST BOOK. CHAPTER VII.
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