The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

good name among men, outward honour and distinction, and in doing so never allows himself to be led astray or induced to lose sight of his end by the charm of present pleasures or the satisfaction of defying the arrogance of the powerful, or the desire of revenging insults and undeserved humiliations he has suffered, or the attractions of useless aesthetic or philosophical occupations of the mind, or travels in interesting lands, but with great consistency works towards his one end, — who ventures to deny that such a philistine is in quite an extraordinary degree rational, even if he has made use of some means which are not praiseworthy but are yet without danger ?

Nay, more, if a bad man, with deliberate shrewdness, through a well-thoughtout plan attains to riches and honours, and even to thrones and crowns, and then with the acutest cunning gets the better of neighbouring states, overcomes them one by one, and now becomes a conqueror of the world, and in doing so is not led astray by any respect for right, any sense of humanity, but with sharp consistency tramples down and dashes to pieces everything that opposes his plan, without compassion plunges millions into misery of every kind, condemns millions to bleed and die, yet royally rewards and always protects his adherents and helpers, never forgetting anything, and thus reaches his end, — who does not see that such a man must go to work in a most rational manner ? — that, as a powerful understanding was needed to form the plans, their execution demanded the 3omplete command of the reason, and indeed properly of practical reason ?

Or are the precepts which the pruient and consistent, the thoughtful and far-seeing Machiavelli prescribes to the prince irrational ? x

1 By the way, Machiavelli's prob- purely the political one how, if he so em was the solution of the question wills, he can carry it out. And the low the prince, as a prince, was to solution of this problem he gives just ceep himself on the throne in spite of as one writes directions for playing nternal and external enemies. His chess, with which it would be folly problem was thus by no means the to mix up the answer to the quesithical problem whether a prince, as tion whether from an ethical point

* man, ought to will such things, but of view it is advisable to play chess

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p. 136

l Ab wickedness is quite consistent with reason, and indeed only becomes really terrible in this conjunction, so, conversely, nobleness is sometimes joined with want of reason.

To this may be attributed the action of Coriolanus, who, after he had applied all his strength for years to the accomplishment of his revenge upon the Romans, when at length the time came, allowed himself to be softened by the prayers of the Senate and the tears of his mother and wife, gave up the revenge he had so long and so painfully prepared, and indeed, by thus bringing on himself the just anger of the Volscians, died for those very Romans whose thanklessness he knew and desired so intensely to punish.

Finally, for the sake of completeness, it may be mentioned that reason may very well exist along with want of understanding. This is the case when a foolish maxim is chosen, but is followed out consistently. An example of this is afforded by the case of the Princess Isabella, daughter of Philip II., who vowed that she would not put on a clean chemise so long as Ostend remained unconquered, and kept her word through three years.

In general all vows are of this class, whose origin is a want of insight as regards the law of causality, i.e., want of understanding; nevertheless it is rational to fulfil them if one is of such narrow understanding as to make them. In agreement with what we have said, we see the writers who appeared just before Kant place the conscience, as the seat of the moral impulses, in opposition to the reason.

Thus Rousseau, in the fourth book of " Umile," says : " La raison nous trompe, mais la conscience ne trompe jamais; " and further on : "U est impossible tfexpliquer par les consequences de notre nature leprincipe immddiat de la conscience independant de la raison mSme. Still further : " Ma sentimens naturels parlaient pour Vinterit commun, ma raison rapportait tout a moi. . . . On a beau vouloir etablir la vrrtu