The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

act, but the willingness to do it, the love from which it proceeds, and without which it is a dead work, constitutes its merit.

Therefore Christianity rightly teaches that all outward works are worthless if they do not proceed from that genuine disposition which consists in true goodwill and pure love, and that what makes blessed and saves is not the works done (opera operata), but the faith, the genuine disposition, which is the gift of the Holy Ghost alone, and which the free, deliberative will, having only the law in view, does not produce.

This demand of Kant's, that all virtuous conduct shall proceed from pure, deliberate respect for the law and in accordance with its abstract maxims, coldly and without inclination, nay, opposed to all inclination, is just the same thing as if he asserted that every work of art must be accomplished by a well-considered application of sssthetical rules. The one is just as perverse as the other.

The question, already handled by Plato and Seneca, whether virtue can be taught, is to be answered in the negative.

We must finally make up our minds to see, what indeed was the source of the Christian doctrine of election by grace, that as regards its chief characteristic and its inner nature, virtue, like genius, is to a certain extent inborn ; and that just as little as all the professors of aesthetics could impart to any one the power of producing works of genius, i.e., genuine works of art, so little could all the professors of ethics and preachers of virtue transform an ignoble into a virtuous and noble character, the impossibility of which is very much more apparent than that of turning lead into gold.

The search for a system of ethics and a first principle of the same, which would have practical influence and would actually transform and better the human race, is just like the search for the philosopher's stone. Yet I have spoken at length at the end of the fourth book of the possibility of an entire change of mind or conversion of man (new birth), not by means of abstract (ethics) but of intuitive knowledge (the work of grace). The contents 3l$o CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.

of that book relieve me generally of the necessity of dwell ing longer upon this point

That Kant by no means penetrated to the real signifi cance of the ethical content of actions is shown finally b; his doctrine of the highest good as the necessary combina tion of virtue and happiness, a combination indeed which virtue would be that which merits happiness. He is here involved in the logical fallacy that the conception of merit, which is here the measure or test, already presupposes a theory of ethics as its own measure, and thus could not be deducible from it. It appeared in our fourth book that all genuine virtue, after it has attained to its highest grade, at last leads to a complete renunciation in which all willing finds an end. Happiness, on the other hand, is a satisfied wish ; thus the two are essentially incapable of being combined. He who has been enlightened by my exposition requires no further explanation of the complete perverseness of this Kantian view of the highest good. And, independent of my positive exposition, I have no further negative exposition to give.

Kant's love of architectonic symmetry meets us also in the " Critique of Practical Reason," for he has given it the shape of the " Critique of Pure Reason," and has again introduced the same titles and forms with manifest intention, which becomes specially apparent in the table of the categories of freedom.