The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

thus by way of simile : The will is the substance of man, the intellect the accident; the will is the matter, the intellect is the form ; the will is warmth, the intellect is light.

We shall now first of all verify and also elucidate thia thesis by the following facts connected with the inner life of man ; and on this opportunity perhaps more will be done for the knowledge of the inner man than is to be found in many systematic psychologies.

i. Not only the consciousness of other things, i.e., the apprehension of the external world, but also self-consciousness, contains, as was mentioned already above, a knower and a known; otherwise it would not be consciousness. For consciousness consists in knowing; but knowing requires a knower and a known ; therefore there could be no self-consciousness if there were not in it also a known opposed to the knower and different from it. As there can be no object without a subject, so also there can be no subject without an object, i.e., no knower without something different from it which is known. Therefore a consciousness which is through and through pure intelligence is impossible. The intelligence is like the sun, which does not illuminate space if there is no object from which its rays are reflected. The knower himself, as such, cannot be known ; otherwise he would be the known of another knower. But now, as the known in self-consciousness we find exclusively the will. For not merely willing and purposing in the narrowest sense, but also all striving, wishing, shunning, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, in short, all that directly constitutes our own weal and woe, desire and aversion, is clearly only affection of the will, is a moving, a modification of willing and not- willing, is just that which, if it takes outward effect, exhibits itself as an act of will proper.1 In all knowledge, however, the known is first

1 It is remarkable that Augustine preceding book he had brought under already knew this. In the fourteenth four categories, cupiditas, timor, labook, "De Civ. Dei," c 6, he speaks of titia, tristitia, and says : " Voluntas est the affectionibus animi, which in the quippe in omnibus, imo omnes nihil

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and essential, not the knower ; for the former is the irpatTOTfTro?, the latter the eKTwro^. Therefore in self-consciousness also the known, thus the will, must be what is first and original ; the knower, on the other hand, only what is secondary, that which has been added, the mirror.

They are related very much as the luminous to the reflecting body ; or, again, as the vibrating strings to the resoundingboard, in which case the note produced would be consciousness. We may also regard the plant as a like symbol of consciousness.

It has, we know, two poles, the root and the corona : the former struggling into darkness, moisture, and cold, the latter into light, dryness, and warmth; then, as the point of indifference of the two poles, where they part asunder, close to the ground, the collum (rhizoma, le collet).

The root is what is essential, original, perennial, the death of which involves that of the corona, is thus the primary ; the corona, on the other hand, is the ostensible, but it has sprung from something else, and it passes away without the root dying ; it is thus secondary.

The root represents the will, the corona the intellect, and the point of indifference of the two, the collum, would be the I, which, as their common termination, belongs to both.

This I is the pro tempore identical subject of knowing and willing, whose identity I called in my very first essay (on the principle of sufficient reason), and in my first philosophical wonder, the miracle tear egoxvv- I* is the temporal starting-point and connecting-link of the whole phenomenon, \i.e., of the objectification of the will : it conditions indeed the phenomenon, but is also conditioned by it.

This comparison may even be carried to the individual nature of men. As a large corona commonly springs only from a large root, so the greatest intellectual capabilities are only found in connection with a vehement and passionate will. A genius of a phlegmatic character and weak passions