The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

In my essay on the principle of sufficient reas< n, § 51, I already proposed a first classification of the scien< accordance with the form of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in them ; and I also touched upon it again in §§ 7 and 1 5 of the first volume of this work. I will give here a small attempt at such a classification,p. 317 which will yet no doubt be susceptible of much improvement and perfecting : —

L Pure a priori Sciences.

1. The doctrine of the ground of being.

(a.) In space : Geometry.

(&.) In time : Arithmetic and Algebra.

2. The doctrine of the ground of knowing : Logic. II. Empirical or a posteriori Sciences. All based upon the ground of becoming, i.e., the law of causalty, and upon the three modes of that law.

1. The doctrine of causes.

(a.) Universal : Mechanics, Hydrodynamics, Physics, Chemistry.

(6.) Particular : Astronomy, Mineralogy, Geology, Technology, Pharmacy.

2. The doctrine of stimuli.

(a.) Universal : Physiology of plants and animals, together with the ancillary science, Anatomy. (5.) Particular: Botany, Zoology, Zootomy,

Comparative Physiology, Pathology,

Therapeutics.

3. The doctrine of motives.

(a.) Universal : Ethics, Psychology. (b.) Particular : Jurisprudence, History.

Philosophy or Metaphysics, as the doctrine of consciousness and its contents in general, or of the whole of experience as such, does not appear in the list, because it does not at once pursue the investigation which the principle of sufficient reason prescribes, but first has this principle itself as its object. It is to be regarded as the thorough bass of all sciences, but belongs to a higher class than they do, and is almost as much related to art as to science. As in music every particular period must correspond to the tonality to which thorough bass has advanced, so every

p. 318

author, in proportion to the line he follows, must bear the stamp of the philosophy which prevails in his time. But besides this, every science has also its special philosophy ; and therefore we speak of the philosophy of botany, of zoology, of history, &c.

By this we must reasonably understand nothing more than the chief results of each science itself, regarded and comprehended from the highest, that is the most general, point of view which is possible within that science.

These general results connect themselves directly with general philosophy, for they supply it with important data, and relieve it from the labour of seeking these itself in the philosophically raw material of the special sciences. These special philosophies therefore stand as a mediating link between their special sciences and philosophy proper.

For since the latter has to give the most general explanations concerning the whole of things, these must also be capable of being brought down and applied to the individual of every species of thing. The philosophy of each science, however, arises independently of philosophy in general, from the data of its own science itself.

Therefore it does not need to wait till that philosophy at last be found ; but if worked out in advance it will certainly agree with the true universal philosophy. This, on the other hand, must be capable of receiving confirmation and illustration from the philosophies of the particular sciences ; for the most general truth must be capable of being proved through the more special truths.

Goethe has afforded a beautiful example of the philosophy of zoology in his reflections on Dalton's and Pander's skeletons of rodents (Hefte zur Morphologie, 1824). And like merit in connection with the same science belongs to Kielmayer, Delamark, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, Cuvier, and many others, in that they have all brought out clearly the complete analogy, the inner relationship, the permanent type, and systematic connection of animal forms. Empirical sciences pursued purely for their own sake and without philosophical tendency are