The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

It seems to me that the doctrine of the laws of thought might be simplified if we were only to set up two, the law of excluded middle and that of sufficient reason. The former thus : " Every predicate can either be affirmed or denied of every subject" Here it is already contained in the " either, or " that both cannot occur at once, and consequently just what is expressed by the laws of identity and contradiction. Thus these would be added as corollaries of that principle which really says that every two concept-spheres must be thought either as united or as

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separated, but never as both at once ; and therefore, even although words are brought together which express the latter, these words assert a process of thought which cannot be carried out. The consciousness of this infeasibility is the feeling of contradiction.

The second law of thought, the principle of sufficient reason, would affirm that the above attributing or denying must be determined by something different from the judgment itself, which may be a (pure or empirical) perception, or merely another judgment. This other and different thing is then called the ground or reason of the judgment.

So far as a judgment satisfies the first law of thought, it is thinkable ; so far as t satisfies the second, it is true, or at least in the case in ,vhich the ground of a judgment is only another judgment t is logically or formally true. But, finally, material or ibsolute truth is always the relation between a judgment md a perception, thus between the abstract and the conrete or perceptible idea.

This is either an immediate elation or it is brought about by means of other judgoents, i.e., through other abstract ideas. From this it is asy to see that one truth can never overthrow another, ut all must ultimately agree ; because in the concrete or erceptible, which is their common foundation, no contraction is possible. Therefore no truth has anything to jar from other truths.

Illusion and error have to fear very truth, because through the logical connection of all •uths even the most distant must some time strike its low at every error. This second law of thought is thereire the connecting link between logic and what is no mger logic, but the matter of thought.

Consequently le agreement of the conceptions, thus of the abstract iea with what is given in the perceptible idea, is, on le side of the object truth, and on the side of the subject wwledge.

To express the union or separation of two concept- )heres referred to above is the work of the copula, " is -is not." Through this every verb can be expressed byp. 288 means of its participle. Therefore all judging consists in the use of a verb, and vice versd. Accordingly the significance of the copula is that the predicate is to be thought in the subject, nothing more. Now, consider what the content of the infinitive of the copula "to be " amounts to. But this is a principal theme of the professors of philosophy of the present time. However, we must not be too strict with them; most of them wish to express by it nothing but material things, the corporeal world, to which, as perfectly innocent realists at the bottom of their hearts, they attribute the highest reality. To speak, however, of the bodies so directly appears to them too vulgar ; and therefore they say u being," which they think sounds better, and think in connection with it the tables and chairs standing before them.

" For, because, why, therefore, thus, since, although, indeed, yet, but, if, then, either, or," and more like these, are properly logical particles, for their only end is to express the form of the thought processes. They are therefore t valuable possession of a language, and do not belong to al in equal numbers. Thus " zwar " (the contracted " es is wahr ") seems to belong exclusively to the German Ian guage. It is always connected with an "aber" whicl follows or is added in thought, as " if " is connected wit] " then."