The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

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bee, still more a permanent, persistent desire, a longing like that of the dog for its absent master, may present the appearance of a purpose, with which, however, it must not be confounded. Now all this has its ultimate ground in the relation between the human and the brute intellect, which may also be thus expressed : The brutes have only direct knowledge, while we, in addition to this, have indirect knowledge ; and the advantage which in many things — for example, in trigonometry and; analysis, in machine work instead of hand work, &c— / indirect has over direct knowledge appears here alsc. Thus again we may say: The brutes have only a single intellect, we a double intellect, both perceptive and thinking, and the operation of the two often go on independently or each other. We perceive one thing, and we think another Often, again, they act upon each other. This way of put" ting the matter enables us specially to understand th<t natural openness and naivete of the brutes, referred x> above, as contrasted with the concealment of man.

However, the law natura nonfacit saltus is not entirsly suspended even with regard to the intellect of the broes, though certainly the step from the brute to the huaan intelligence is the greatest which nature has made in the production of her creatures. In the most favoured hdividuals of the highest species of the brutes there certinly sometimes appears, always to our astonishment, a aint trace of reflection, reason, the comprehension of wons, of thought, purpose, and deliberation. The most stiking indications of this kind are afforded by the elephant, *hose highly developed intelligence is heightened and suported by an experience of a lifetime which sometimes e.tends to two hundred years. He has often given unmistkable signs, recorded in well-known anecdotes, of premedtation, which, in the case of brutes, always astonishes u more than anything else. Such, for instance, is the stor of the tailor on whom an elephant revenged himself for picking him with a needle. I wish, however, to resce fromp. 233 oblivion a parallel case to this, because it has the advantage of being authenticated by judicial investigation. On the 27th of August 1830 there was held at Morpeth, in England, a coroner's inquest on the keeper, Baptist Bernhard, who was killed by his elephant. It appeared from the evidence that two years before he had offended the elephant grossly, and now, without any occasion, but on a favourable opportunity, the elephant had seized him and crushed him. (See the Spectator and other English papers of that day.) For special information on the intelligence of brutes I recommend Leroy's excellent book, " Sur V Intelligence des Animaicx," nouv. 4d. 1802.

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CHAPTER VL

ON THE DOCTRINE OF ABSTRACT OR RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The outward impression upon the senses, together with the mood which it alone awakens in us, vanishes with the presence of the thing. Therefore these two cannot of themselves constitute experience proper, whose teaching is to guide our conduct for the future. The image of that impression which the imagination preserves is originally weaker than the impression itself, and becomes weaker and weaker daily, until in time it disappears altogether. There is only one thing which is not subject either to the instantaneous vanishing of the impression or to the gradual disappearance of its image, and is therefore free from the power of time. This is the conception. In it, then, the teaching of experience must be stored up, and it alone is suited to be a safe guide to our steps in life. Therefore Seneca says rightly, " Si vis tibi omnia subjicere, te subjice rationi" (Ep. 37). And I add to this that the essential condition of surpassing others in actual life is that we should reflect or deliberate. Such an important tool of the intellect as the concept evidently cannot be identical with the word, this mere sound, which as an impression of sense passes with the moment, or as a phantasm of hearing dies away with time. Yet the concept is an idea, the distinct consciousness and preservation of which are bound up with the word. Hence the Greeks called word, concept, relation, thought, and reason by the name of the first, o X0709. Yet the concept is perfectly different both from the word,

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