The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

aliud, quam voluntates sunt : nam volumus t et quid est metus atque trisquid est cupiditas et Icetitia, nisi vo- titia, nisi voluntas in dissensionem a& luntas in eorum consensioncm, qua his, quce nolumus ? cet"

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would resemble those succulent plants that, with a considerable corona consisting of thick leaves, have very small roots ; will not, however, be found. That vehemence of will and passionateness of character are conditions of heightened intelligence exhibits itself physiologically through the fact that the activity of the brain is conditioned by the movement which the great arteries running towards the basis cerebri impart to it with each pulsation; therefore an energetic pulse, and even, according to Bichat, a short neck, is a requisite of great activity of the brain. But the opposite of the above certainly occurs : vehement desires, passionate, violent character, along with weak intellect, i.e., a small brain of bad conformation in a thick skulL This is a phenomenon as common as it is repulsive : we might perhaps compare it to beetroot

2. But in order not merely to describe consciousness figuratively, but to know it thoroughly, we have first of all to find out what appears in the same way in every consciousness, and therefore, as the common and constant element, will also be the essential. Then we shall consider what distinguishes one consciousness from another, which accordingly will be the adventitious and secondary element.

Consciousness is positively only known to us as a property of animal nature ; therefore we must not, and indeed cannot, think of it otherwise than as animal consciousness, so that this expression is tautological. Now, that which in every animal consciousness, even the most imperfect and the weakest, is always present, nay, lies at its foundation, is an immediate sense of longing, and of the alternate satisfaction and non-satisfaction of it, in very different degrees. This we know to a certain extent a priori. F marvellously different as the innumerable species of animals are, and strange as some new form, never seen before, appears to us, we yet assume beforehand its inmost nature, with perfect certainty, as well known, and indeed fully confided to us. We know that the animal wills, indeed also what it wills, existence, well-being, life, and propagant

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tion ; and since in this we presuppose with perfect certaintyidentity with us, we do not hesitate to attribute to it unchanged all the affections of will which we know in ourselves, and speak at once of its desire, aversion, fear, ano-er, hatred, love, joy, sorrow, longing, &c. On the other hand, whenever phenomena of mere knowledge come to be spoken of we fall at once into uncertainty.

We do not venture to say that the animal conceives, thinks, judges, knows : we only attribute to it with certainty ideas in general; because without them its mill could not have those emotions referred to above. But with regard to the definite manner of knowing of the brutes and the precise limits of it in a given species, we have only indefinite conceptions, and make conjectures.

Hence our understanding with them is also often difficult, and is only brought about by skill, in consequence of experience and practice. Here then lie distinctions of consciousness. On the other hand, a longing, desiring, wishing, or a detesting, shunning, and ['not wishing, is proper to every consciousness: man has it in common with the polyp. This is accordingly the essential element in and the basis of every consciousness.

The difference of the manifestations of this in the different species of animal beings depends upon the various extension of their sphere of knowledge, in which the motives of those manifestations lie. "We understand directly from our own nature all actions and behaviour of the brutes which express movements of the will ; therefore, so far, we sympathise with them in various ways.

On the other hand, the gulf between us and them results simply and solely from the difference of intellect.

The gulf which lies between a very sagacious brute and a man of very limited capacity is perhaps not much greater than that which exists between a blockhead and a man of genius ; therefore here also the resemblance between them in another aspect, which springs from the likeness of their inclinations and emotions, and assimilates them again to each other, sometimes appears with surprising promi416 SECOND BOOK. CHAPTER XIX.