The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
This table of the categories is now made the guiding clue according to which every metaphysical, and indeed every scientific inquiry is to be conducted (Prolegomena, § 39).
And, in fact, it is not only the foundation of the whole Kantian philosophy and the type according to which its symmetry is everywhere carried out, as I have already shown above, but it has also really become the procrustean bed into which Kant forces every possible inquiry, by means of a violence which I shall now consider somewhat more closely. But with such an opportunity what must not the imitatores servumpecus have done ! We have seen.
That violence then is applied in this way. The meaning of the expressions denoted by the titles, forms of judgment and categories, is entirely set aside and forgotten, and the expressions alone are retained. These have their source partly in Aristotle's Ancdyt. priora, i.
23 (irepi ttolot^to^ Kai iro<roTT)To<i twv tov avWoyuTfiov opoav : de qualitate et quantitate terminorum syllogismi), but are arbitrarily chosen ; for the extent of the concepts might certainly have been otherwise expressed than through the word quantity, though this word is more suited to its object than the rest of the titles of the categories.
Even the word quality has obviously been chosen on account of the custom of opposing quality to quantity ; for the name quality is certainly taken arbitrarily enough for affirmation and negation.
But now in every inquiry instituted by Kant, every quantity in time and space, and every possible quality of things, physical, moral, &c, is brought by him under those category titles, although between these things and those titles of the forms of judgment and of thought there is absolutely nothing in common except the accidental and arbitrary nomenclature.
It is needful to keep in mind all the respect which in other regards is due to Kant to enable one to refrain from expressing in hard terms one's repugnance to this procedure. The nearest example is afforded us at once by the pure physiological table of the general principles of natural science. What in all the world has the quantity of judgments to do with the fact that every perception has an extensive magnitude ? What has the quality of judgments to do with the fact that every sensation has a degree ?
The former rests rather on the fact that space is the form of our external perception, and the latter is nothing more than an empirical, and, moreover, entirely subjective feeling, drawn merely from the consideration of the nature of our organs of sense. Further, in the table which gives the basis of rational psychology (Critique of Pure Eeason, p. 344 ; V.
402), the simplicity of the soul is cited under quality ; but this is just a quantitative property, and has absolutely no relation to the affirmation or negation in the judgment. But quantity had to be completed by the unity of the soul, which is, however, already included in its simplicity.
Then modality is forced in in an absurd way ; the soul stands in connection with possible objects ; but connection belongs to relation, only this is already taken possession of by substance. Then the four cosmological Ideas, which are the material of the antinomies, are referred to the titles of the categories ; but of this we shall speak more fully further on, when we come to the examination of these antinomies.
Several, if possible, still more glaring examples are to be found in the table of the Categories of Freedom ! in the " Critique of Practical Eeason ; " also in the first book of the " Critique of Judgment," which goes through the judgment of taste according to the four titles of the categories ; and, finally, in the " Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science," which are entirely adapted to the table of the categories, whereby the false that is mingled here and there with what is true and excellent in this important work is for the most part introduced. See, for example, at the end of the first chapter how the unity, the multiplicity, and the
The principle of the Permanence of Substance is deduced from the category of subsistence and inherence. This, however, we know only from the form of the categorical judgment, i.e., from the connection of two concepts as subject and predicate. "With what violence then is that great metaphysical principle made dependent upon this simple, purely logical form ! Yet this is only done pro forma, and for the sake of symmetry.
The proof of this principle, which is given here, sets entirely aside its supposed origin in the understanding and in the category, and is based upon the pure intuition or perception of time. But this proof also is quite incorrect.
It is false that in mere time there is simultaneity and duration; these ideas only arise from the union of space with time, as I have already shown in the essay on the principle of sufficient reason, § 18, and worked out more fully in § 4 of the present work. I must assume a knowledge of both these expositions for the understanding of what follows.
It is false that time remains the same through all change ; on the contraiy, it is just time itself that is fleeting; a permanent time is a contradiction. Kant's proof is untenable, strenuously as he has supported it with sophisms; indeed, he falls into the most palpable contradictions. Thus, after he has falsely set up co-existence as a mode of time (p. 1 77 ; V. 219), he says, quite rightly (p. 183 ; V.
226), " Co-existence is not a mode of time, for in time there are absolutely no parts together, but all in succession. In truth, space is quite as much implicated in co-existence as time. For if two things are co-existent and yet not one, they are different in respect of space ; if two states of one thing are co-existent (e.g., the glow and the heat of iron), then they are two contemporaneous effects of one thing,
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