The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
All ancient moral systems, with the single exception of that of Plato, were guides to a happy life. Accordingly in them the end of virtue was entirely in this life, not beyond death. For to them it is only the right path to a truly happy life ; and on this account the wise choose it. Hence arise those lengthy debates chiefly preserved for us by Cicero, those keen and constantly renewed investigations, whether virtue quite alone and in itself is really sufficient for a happy life, or whether this further requires some external condition ; whether the virtuous and wise may also be happy on the rack and the wheel, or in the bull of Phalaris ; or whether it does not go as far as this. For certainly this would be the touchstone of an ethical system of this kind ; the practice of it must give happiness directly and unconditionally. If it cannot do this it does not accomplish what it ought,
MiON THE USE OF REASON AND STOICISM. 349 and must be rejected. It is therefore with truth and in accordance with the Christian point of view that Augustine prefaces his exposition of the moral systems of the ancients (De Civ. Dei, lib. xix. c. 1) with the explanation : " Exponenda sunt nobis argumenta mortalium, quibus sibi ipsi beatitudinem faccrc IN hujus yitje INFELICITATE moliti sunt ; ut ab eorum rebus vanis spes nostra quid differat clarescat.
De finibus bonorum et malorum multa inter se philosophi disputarunt; quam qucestionem maxima intentione versantes, invcnire conati sunt, quid efficiat hominem beatum: Mud enim est finis bonorum. I wish to place beyond all doubt the eudsemonistic end which we have ascribed to all ancient ethics by several express statements of the ancients themselves. Aristotle says in the " Eth. Magna" i.
4: "'H evhaifiovut ev T(p ev %yv eari, to Be ev Zflv ev tcd Kara ra<; aperas %yv." (Felicitas in bene vivendo posita est : verum bene vivere est in eo positum, ut secundum virtutem vivamus), with which may be compared " Eth. Nicom." i. 5. " Cic. Tusc" v.
1 : " Nam, quum ea causa impulerit eos, qui primi se ad philosophies studia contulerunt, ut, omnibus rebus posthabitis, totos se in optimo vitoz statu exquirendo collocarent ; profecto spe beate vivendi tantam in eo studio curam operamque posuerunt. According to Plutarch (De Repugn. Stoic, c. xviii.) Chrysippus said : " To Kara /caiciav tflv tw /ca/coSaifioveos %yv ravrov eari." ( Vitiose vivere idem est quod vivere infeliciter.) Ibid., c.
26 : " 'H <$>povwcn<i ov% erepov ecrv T179 evBaifiovia? Ka& eavro, aW evBai/xovia." (Prudentia nihil differt a felicitate, estque ipsa adeo felicitas.) " Stob. Eel.," Lib. ii. c. 7 : " TeXo? Se <paatv ewai to evBacfioveiv, 6v evetca ttavra irpaTreTai." (Finem esse dicunt felicitatem, cujus causa fiunt omnia.) " EvSac/iovcav avvcowp,eiv T(p Tekei Xeyovai." (Finem bonorum et felicitatem synonyma esse dicunt.) " Arrian Diss. Epict." i.
4 : " 'H apeTT) TavTTjv e^ei ti\v errayyeXiav, evSaip.oviav Troirjaat." ( Virtus profitetur, se felicitatem pro3stare.) Sen., Ep. 90 : " Ceterum (sapientia) ad beatum statum tendit, Mo ducit.
The ethics of the Cynics also adopted this end of the happiest life, as the Emperor Julian expressly testifies (Orat. vi.) : " Tt}<; Kuvt/cr}<; Se (pCkoaotpias <tkoito<; fiev eari /cat re\o?, dxnrep Br) /cat iraat]^ <pikoao<pia<;, to evSaifjuovetv' to Se evSaifioveiv ev ra> tflv Kara <f>vo~tv, aWa p.r\ 7rpo<? ra<$ riov iroWtov Sof-as." (Cynicce philosophice ut etiam omnis philosophice, scopus et finis est feliciter vivere : felicitas vitce autem in eo posita est, ut secundum naturam vivatur, nee vero secundum opiniones multitudinis.) Only the Cynics followed quite a peculiar path to this end, a path directly opposed to the ordinary one — the path of extreme privation.
They start from the insight that the motions of the will which are brought about by the objects which attract and excite it, and the wearisome, and for the most part vain, efforts to attain these, or, if they are attained, the fear of losing them, and finally the loss itself, produce far greater pain than the want of all these objects ever can.
Therefore, in order to attain to the life that is most free from pain, they chose the path of the extremest destitution, and fled from all pleasures as snares through \ which one was afterwards handed over to pain. But '£ after this they could boldly scorn happiness and its I caprices. This is the spirit of cynicism.
Seneca dis- 1 tinctly expresses it in the eighth chapter, " De Tranquili- I tote Animi : " " Gogitandum est, guanto levior dolor sit, non i habere, quam perdere : et intelligemus paupertati eo mino- $ rem tormentorum, quo minorem damnorum esse materiam. Then : " Tolerabilius est, faciliusque, non acquirere, quam amittere. . . . Diogenes effecit, ne quid sibi eripi posset, ... qui se fortuitis omnibus eccuit. . . .
Videtur mihi dixisse ; age tuum negotium, fortuna : nihil apud Diogenem jam ) tuum est. The parallel passage to this last sentence is ,1 the quotation of Stobaeus {Eel. ii. 7) : "Aioyevys e<pv vofii- • %eiv opav TTjv Tv)(r,v evoptoaav avrov xai XeyovaaV tovtov I
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