The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
* To feel me in the solitude of kings Without the po'Arer that makes them bear a crown."
— Proph. of Dante, c
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For intellect is a differentiating, and therefore a separating principle. Its different grades, far more than those of mere culture, give to each man different conceptions, in consequence of which each man lives to a certain extent in a different world, in which he can directly meet those only who are like himself, and can only attempt to speak to the rest and make himself understood by them from a distance. Great differences in the grade and in the cultivation of the understanding fix a wide gulf between man and man, which can only be crossed by benevolence ; for it is, on the contrary, the unifying principle, which identifies every one else with its own self. Yet the connection remains a moral one ; it cannot become intellectual. Indeed, when the degree of culture is about the same, the conversation between a man of great intellect and an ordinary man is like the journey together of two men, one of whom rides on a spirited horse and the other goes on foot. It soon becomes very trying to both of them, and for any length of time impossible. For a short way the rider can indeed dismount, in order to walk with the other, though even then the impatience of his horse will give him much to do.
But the public could be benefited by nothing so much is by the recognition of that intellectual aristocracy of wture. By virtue of such recognition it would comprelend that when facts are concerned, thus when the natter has to be decided from experiments, travels, codes, dstories, and chronicles, the normal mind is certainly ufficient; but, on the other hand, when mere thoughts re in question, especially those thoughts the material or ata of which are within reach of every one, thus when it i really only a question of thinking before others, decided
3flectiveness, native eminence, which only nature bestows, ad that very seldom, is inevitably demanded, and no one eserves to be heard who does not at once give proofs
! this. If the public could be brought to see this for self, it would no longer waste the time which is sparingly
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FIRST BOOK. CHAPTER XV.
measured out to it for its culture on the productions of ordinary minds, thus on the innumerable botches of poetry and philosophy which are produced every day. It would no longer seize always what is newest, in the childish delusion that books, like eggs, must be enjoyed while they are fresh, but would confine itself to the works of the few select and chosen minds of all ages and nations would strive to learn to know and understand them, anc might thus by degrees attain to true culture. And then also, those thousands of uncalled-for productions which like tares, hinder the growth of the good wheat wouh be discontinued.
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CHAPTER XVL1
ON THE PRACTICAL USE OF REASON AND ON STOICISM.
In the seventh chapter I have shown that, in the theoretical sphere, procedure based upon conceptions suffices for mediocre achievements only, while great achievements, on the other hand, demand that we should draw from perception itself as the primary source of all knowledge. In the practical sphere, however, the converse is the case. Here determination by what is perceived is the way of the brutes, but is unworthy of man, who has conceptions to guide his conduct, and is thus emancipated from the power of what is actually perceptibly present, to which the brute is unconditionally given over. In proportion as a man makes good this prerogative his conduct may be called rational, and only in this sense can we speak of practical reason, not in the Kantian sense, the inadmissibility of which I have thoroughly exposed in my prize essay on the foundation of morals.
It is not easy, however, to let oneself be determined by conceptions alone; for the directly present external world, with its perceptible reality, intrudes itself forcibly even on the strongest mind. But it is just in conquering this impression, in destroying its illusion, that the human spirit shows its worth and greatness. Thus if incitements to lust and pleasure leave it unaffected, if the threats and fury of enraged enemies do not shake it, if the entreaties of erring friends do not make its
1 This chapter is connected with § 16 of the first volume.
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