The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

n sympathy with us. And all this by conducting the tream of our thought into their minds, through the aedium of words, with such force as to carry their hought from the direction it has already taken, and weep it along with ours in its course. The more their revious course of thought differs from ours, the greater i this achievement. From this it is easily understood ow personal conviction and passion make a man elouent; and in general, eloquence is more the gift of ature than the work of art; yet here, also, art will lpport nature.

In order to convince another of a truth which conflicts ith an error he firmly holds, the first rule to be observed, an easy and natural one : let the premisses come first, and e conclusion follow. Yet this rule is seldom observed, it reversed; for zeal, eagerness, and dogmatic positive- 's urge us to proclaim the conclusion loudly and noisily ;ainst him who adheres to the opposed error. This easily akes him shy, and now he opposes his will to all reasons d premisses, knowing already to what conclusion they ad. Therefore we ought rather to keep the conclusion (mpletely concealed, and only advance the premisses

This chapter is connected with the conclusion of § 9 of the first volume. VOL. IL U

p. 306

distinctly, fully, and in different lights. Indeed, if possibl we ought not to express the conclusion at all. It come necessarily and regularly of its own accord into the reason of the hearers, and the conviction thus born in themselves will be all the more genuine, and will also be accompanied by self-esteem instead of shame. Id difficult cases we may even assume the air of desiring tc arrive at a quite opposite conclusion from that which we really have in view. An example of this is the famous speech of Antony in Shakspeare's " Julius Caesar."

In defending a thing many persons err by confident!} advancing everything imaginable that can be said for it mixing up together what is true, half true, and merel; plausible. But the false is soon recognised, or at any rat felt, and throws suspicion also upon the cogent and tru arguments which were brought forward along with i Give then the true and weighty pure and alone, beware of defending a truth with inadequate, and there fore, since they are set up as adequate, sophistical reasons for the opponent upsets these, and thereby gains tl appearance of having upset the truth itself which m supported by them, that is, he makes argumenta c hominem hold good as argumenta ad rem. The Chine go, perhaps, too far the other way, for they have tl saying: "He who is eloquent and has a sharp tongi may always leave half of a sentence unspoken ; and ) who has right on his side may confidently yield thre tenths of his assertion."

( 307 )

CHAPTER XII.1

OK THE DOCTRINE OF SCIENCE.

^ROM the analysis of the different functions of our intellect iven in the whole of the preceding chapters, it is clear hat for a correct use of it, either in a theoretical or a ractical reference, the following conditions are demanded :

[.) The correct apprehension through perception of the sal things taken into consideration, and of all their

>sential properties and relations, thus of all data. (2.)

he construction of correct conceptions out of these ; thus e connotation of those properties under correct abstracms, which now become the material of the subsequent inking. (3.) The comparison of those conceptions both

.th the perceived object and among themselves, and th the rest of our store of conceptions, so that correct jlgments, pertinent to the matter in hand, and fully cnprehending and exhausting it, may proceed from them;

tis the right estimation of the matter. (4.) The placing t;ether or combination of those judgments as the premisses

0 syllogisms. This may be done very differently accordH to the choice and arrangement of the judgments, and y> the actual result of the whole operation primarily d>ends upon it. What is really of importance here is tit from among so many possible combinations of those

A'erent judgments which have to do with the matter fr$ deliberation should hit upon the very ones which sire the purpose and are decisive. But if in the first action, that is, in the apprehension through perception

1 This chapter is connected with § 14 of the first volume.

p. 308

of the things and relations, any single essential point hi been overlooked, the correctness of all the succee operations of the mind cannot prevent the result fro: being false; for there lie the data, the material of the whole investigation. Without the certainty that these are correctly and completely collected, one ought to abstain, in important matters, from any definite decision.