The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

On the "Critique of Judgment" also, after what has been said, I must be very short. We cannot but be surprised that Kant, to whom art certainly was very foreign, and who to all appearance had little susceptibility for the beautiful, indeed probably never had the opportunity of seeing an important work of art, and who seems, finally, to have had no knowledge of Goethe, the only man of his century and nation who was fit to be placed by his side as his giant equal, — it is, I say, surprising how, notwithstanding all this, Kant was able to render a great and permanent service to the philosophical consideration of art and the beautiful. His merit lies in this, that much as men had reflected upon the beautiful and upon art, they had yet really always considered it only from the empirical point of view, and had investigated upon a basis

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of facts what quality distinguished the object of any kind which was called beautiful from other objects of the same kind. On this path they first arrived at quite special principles, and then at more general ones. They sought to separate true artistic beauty from false, and to discover marks of this genuineness, which could then serve again as rules.

What gives pleasure as beautiful and what does not, what therefore is to be imitated, what is to be striven against, what is to be avoided, what rules, at least negative rules, are to be established, in short, what are the means of exciting aesthetic satisfaction, i.e., what are the conditions of this residing in the object — this was almost exclusively the theme of all treatises upon art.

This path was followed by Aristotle, and in the most recent times we find it chosen by Home, Burke, Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, and many others.

It is true that the universality of the aesthetical principles discovered finally led back to the subject, and it was observed that if the effect upon the subject were adequately known we would then also be able to determine a priori the causes of this which lie in the object, and thus alone this method of treatment could attain to the certainty of a science. This occasioned once and again psychological disquisitions.

Specially however, Alexander Baumgarten produced with this intention a general aesthetic of all beauty, in which he started from the conception of the perfection of sensu3us knowledge, that is, of knowledge of perception. With aim also, however, the subjective part is done with as soon as this conception has been established, and he passes m to the objective part and to the practical, which is conlected with it.

But here also the merit was reserved for Hant of investigating seriously and profoundly the feeling tself, in consequence of which we call the object occasioning t beautiful, in order to discover, wherever it was possible, he constituent elements and conditions of it in our nature, lis investigation, therefore, took an entirely subjective lirection. This path was clearly the right one, for in

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order to explain a phenomenon which is given in i effects, one must know accurately this effect itself, if o is to determine thoroughly the nature of the cause. Yet Kant's merit in this regard does not really extend much further than this, that he has indicated the right path, and by a provisional attempt has given an example of how, more or less, it is to be followed. For what he gave cannot be regarded as objective truth and as a real gain. He gave the method for this investigation, he broke ground in the right direction, but otherwise he missed the mark.