The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

With the first class of ideas, i.e., the real world of pel ception, the idea of matter is also given ; because the la' governing this class of ideas, the law of causality, detei mines the change of the states or conditions, and thes conditions themselves presuppose something permanen whose changes they are. When speaking above of tl principle of the permanence of substance, I showed, I reference to earlier passages, that this idea of matt arises because in the understanding, for which alone

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exists, time and space are intimately united, and the share of space in this product exhibits itself as the per-, manence of matter, while the share of time appears as the change of states. Purely in itself, matter can only be thought in dbstracto, and not perceived ; for to perception it always appears already in form and quality.

From this conception of matter, substance is again an abstraction, consequently a higher germs, and arose in this way. Of the conception of matter, only the predicate of permanence was allowed to remain, while all its other essential properties, extension, impenetrability, divisibility, &c, were thought away.

Like every higher genus, then, the concept substance contains less in itself than the concept matter, but, unlike every other higher genus, it does not contain more under it, because it does not include several lower genera besides matter ; but this remains the one true species of the concept substance, the only assignable thing by which its content is realised and receives a proof.

Thus the aim with which in other cases the reason produces by abstraction a higher conception, in order that in it several subordinate species may be thought at once through common determinations, has here no place ; consequently that abstraction is either undertaken idly and entirely without aim, or it has a secret secondary purpose.

This secret purpose is now brought to light; for under the conception substance, along with its true sub-species matter, a second species is co-ordinated — the immaterial, simple, indestructible substance, soul. But the surreptitious introduction of this last concept arose from the fact that the higher concept substance was framed illogically, and in a manner contrary to law.

In its legitimate procedure the reason always frames the concept of a higher genus by placing together the concepts of several species, and now comparing them, proceeds discursively, and by omitting their differences and retaining the qualities in which they agree, obtains the generic concept which includes them all but has a smaller content. From this

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it follows that the concepts of the species must alwayi precede the concept of the genus. But, in the presen' case, the converse is true. Only the concept matte: existed before the generic concept substance. The latte; was without occasion, and consequently without justifies, tion, as it were aimlessly framed from the former by thi arbitrary omission of all its determinations except one Not till afterwards was the second ungenuine specie placed beside the concept matter, and so foisted in. Bu for the framing of this second concept nothing more wa now required than an express denial of what had alread; been tacitly omitted in the higher generic concept, exteD sion, impenetrability, and divisibility. Thus the concep substance was framed merely to be the vehicle for the sui reptitious introduction of the concept of the immateru substance. Consequently, it is very far from being capabl of holding good as a category or necessary function of tb understanding; rather is it an exceedingly superfluor concept, because its only true content lies already in tb concept of matter, besides which it contains only a grej void, which can be filled up by nothing but the illicit! introduced species immaterial substance; and, indeed, was solely for the purpose of containing this that it wi framed. Accordingly, in strictness, the concept substam must be entirely rejected, and the concept matter ever where put in its place.