The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
The imperfections here proved to be essential to the intellect are constantly increased, however, in particular cases, by non-essential imperfections. The intellect is never in every respect what it possibly might be. The perfections possible to it are so opposed that they exclude each other. Therefore no man can be at once Plato and Aristotle, or Shakspeare and Newton, or Kant and Goethe. The imperfections of the intellect, on the contrary, consort very well together ; therefore in reality it for the most part remains far below what it might be. Its functions depend upon so very many conditions, which we can only comprehend as anatomical and physiological, in the phenomenon in which alone they are given us, that a decidedly excelling intellect, even in one respect alone, is among the rarest of uatural phenomena. Therefore the productions of such an vol. 11. Y
p. 338
intellect are preserved through thousands of years, indeec every relic of such a highly favoured individual become; a most valuable treasure. From such an intellect dowi to that which approaches imbecility the gradations an innumerable.
And primarily, in conformity with thes< gradations, the mental horizon of each of us varies ver much from the mere comprehension of the present, whic) even the brute has, to that which also embraces the nex hour, the day, even the morrow, the week, the year, th life, the century, the thousand years, up to that of the cod sciousness which has almost always present, even thoug obscurely dawning, the horizon of the infinite, and whos thoughts therefore assume a character in keeping wit this.
Further, that difference among intelligences show itself in the rapidity of their thinking, which is very in portant, and which may be as different and as finely gradv. ated as that of the points in the radius of a revolving dis> The remoteness of the consequents and reasons to whic any one's thought can extend seems to stand in a certai relation to the rapidity of his thinking, for the greate: exertion of thought-power in general can only last quit a short time, and yet only while it lasts can a thought 1 thought out in its complete unity.
It therefore amoun to this, how far the intellect can pursue it in so short time, thus what length of path it can travel in it. C the other hand, in the case of some, rapidity may be mai up for by the greater duration of that time of perfect concentrated thought. Probably the slow and lastii thought makes the mathematical mind, while rapidity thought makes the genius.
The latter is a flight, tl former a sure advance upon firm ground, step by ste Yet even in the sciences, whenever it is no longer question of mere quantities, but of understanding t nature of phenomena, this last kind of thinking is i adequate. This is shown, for example, by Newton's theo of colour, and later by Biot's nonsense about colour rin; which yet agrees with the whole atomistic method treating light among the French, with its moldcules de lumibre, and in general with their fixed idea of reducing everything in nature to mere mechanical effects. Lastly, the great individual diversity of intelligence we are speaking about shows itself excellently in the degrees of the clearness of understanding, and accordingly in the distinctness of the whole thinking.
To one man that is to understand which to another is only in some degree to observe; the one is already done and at the goal while the other is only at the beginning; to the one that is the solution which to the other is only the problem. This depends on the quality of thought and knowledge, which was already referred to above. As in rooms the degree of light varies, so does it in minds.
We can detect this quality of the whole thought as soon as we have read only a few pages of an author.
For in doing so we have been obliged to understand both with his understanding and in his sense; and therefore before we know all that he has thought we see already how he thinks, what is the formal nature, the texture of his thinking, which remains the same in every- :hing about which he thinks, and whose expression is :he train of thought and the style.
In this we feel at mce the pace, the flexibleness and lightness, even indeed 'he soaring power of his mind; or, on the contrary, its lulness, formality, lameness and leaden quality. For, as anguage is the expression of the mind of a nation, style s the more immediate expression of the mind of an .uthor than even his physiognomy.
We throw a book side when we observe that in it we enter an obscurer egion than our own, unless we have to learn from it aere facts, not thoughts. Apart from mere facts, only hat author will afford us profit whose understanding i keener and clearer than our own, who forwards our linking instead of hindering it, like the dull mind that 'ill force us to keep pace with the toad-like course of s thought ; thus that author with whose mind it gives
No commentary for this page under the selected tracks.
There is commentary on page 1.