The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

conceptions is a principle. We shall return to this arbitrary and inadmissible distinction later, when we come to the Dialectic. On p. 330 ; V. 386, reason is the faculty of inference ; mere judging (p. 69 ; V. 94) he often explains as the work of the understanding.

Now, this really amounts to saying : Judging is the work of the understanding so long as the ground of the judgment is empirical, transcendental, or metalogical (Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 31, 32, 33); but if it is logical, as is the case with the syllogism, then we are here concerned with a quite special and much more important faculty of knowledge — the reason. Nay, what is more, on p. 303 ; V.

360, it is explained that what follows directly from a proposition is still a matter of the understanding, and that only those conclusions which are arrived at by the use of a mediating conception are the work of the reason, and the example given is this : From the proposition, " All men are mortal," the inference, " Some mortals are men," may be drawn by the mere understanding.

On the other hand, to draw the conclusion, "All the learned are mortal," demands an entirely different and far more important faculty — the reason. How was it possible for a great thinker to write the like of this! On p. 553; V. 581, reason is all at once the constant condition of all voluntary action. On p. 614; V. 642, it consists in the fact that we can give an account of our assertions; on pp. 643, 644; V.

671, 672, in the circumstance that it brings unity into the conceptions of the understanding by means of Ideas, as the understanding brings unity into the multiplicity of objects by means of conceptions. On p. 646 ; V. 674, it is nothing else than the faculty which deduces the particular from the general

The understanding also is constantly being explained anew. In seven passages of the " Critique of Pure Reason " it is explained in the following terms. On p. 5 1 ; V. 75, it is the faculty which of itself produces ideas of perception. On p. 69 ; V. 94, it is the faculty of judging,p. 27 i.e., of thinking, i.e., of knowing through conceptions. On p. 1 37 of the fifth edition, it is the faculty of knowledge generally. On p. 132; V. 171, it is the faculty of rules. On p. 158 ; V. 197, however, it is said : " It is not only the faculty of rules, but the source of principles (Grundsdtze) according to which everything comes under rules ; " and yet above it was opposed to the reason because the latter alone was the faculty of principles (Princijrien). On p. 1 60; V. 199, the understanding is the faculty of conceptions ; but on p. 302 ; V. 359, it is the faculty of the unity of phenomena by means of rules.

Against such really confused and groundless language on the subject (even though it comes from Kant) I shall have no need to defend the explanation which I have given of these two faculties of knowledge — an explanation which is fixed, clearly defined, definite, simple, and in full agreement with the language of all nations and all ages. I have only quoted this language as a proof of my charge that Kant follows his symmetrical, logical system without sufficiently reflecting upon the subject he is thus handling.

Now, as I have said above, if Kant bad seriously examined how far two such different faculties of knowledge, one of which is the specific difference of man, may be known., and what, in accordance with the language of all nations and all philosophers, reason and understanding are, he would never, without further authority than the intellectus theoreticus and practicus of the Schoolmen, which is used in an entirely different sense, have divided the reason into theoretical and practical, and made the latter the source of virtuous conduct. In the same way, before Kant separated so carefully conceptions of the understanding (by which he sometimes means his categories, sometimes all general conceptions) and conceptions of the reason (his so-called Ideas), and made them both the material of his philosophy, which for the most part deals only with the validity, application, and origin of all these conceptions ; — first, I say, he ought to have really

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