The World as Will and Idea, Vol. II — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

But in the last instance, or in the secret of our inne: being, what sets in activity the association of though itself, the laws of which were set forth above, is the vrill which urges its servant the intellect, according to th measure of its powers, to link thought to thought, to re call the similar, the contemporaneous, to recognise reason and consequents. For it is to the interest of the wi] that, in general, one should think, so that one may b well equipped for all cases that may arise. Therefore th form of the principle of sufficient reason which govern the association of thoughts and keeps it active is ult; mately the law of motivation. For that which rules th sensorium, and determines it to follow the analogy or otht association of thoughts in this or that direction, is th will of the thinking subject. Now just as here the lav* of the connection of ideas subsist only upon the basis < the will, so also in the real world the causal connectiop. 329 of bodies really subsists only upon the basis of the will, which manifests itself in the phenomena of this world. On this account the explanation from causes is never absolute and exhaustive, but leads back to forces of nature as their condition, and the inner being of the latter is just the will as thing in itself. In saying this, however, I have certainly anticipated the following book.

But because now the outward (sensible) occasions of the presence of our ideas, just as well as the inner occasions (those of association), and both independently of each other, constantly affect the consciousness, there arise from this the frequent interruptions of our course of thought, which introduce a certain cutting up and confusion of our thinking. This belongs to its imperfections which cannot be explained away, and which we shall now consider in a separate chapter.

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CHAPTER XV.

ON THE ESSENTIAL IMPERFECTIONS OF THE INTELLECT.

Oub self-consciousness has not space but only time as its form, and therefore we do not think in three dimensions, as we perceive, but only in one, thus in a line, without breadth or depth. This is the source of the greatest of the essential imperfections of our intellect. We can know all things only in succession, and can become conscious of only one at a time, indeed even of this one only under the condition that for the time we forget everything else, thus are absolutely unconscious of everything else, so that for the time it ceases to exist as far as we are concerned. In respect of this quality our intellect may be compared to a telescope with a very narrow field of vision; just because our consciousness is not stationary but fleeting. The intellect apprehends only successively, and in order to grasp one thing must let another go, retaining nothing but traces of it, which are ever becoming weaker. The thought which is vividly present to me now must after a little while have escaped me altogether ; and if a good night's sleep intervene, it may be that I shall never find it again, unless it is connected with my personal interests, that is, with my will, which always commands the field.

Upon this imperfection of the intellect depends the disconnected and often fragmentary nature of our course of thought, which I have already touched on at the close of last chapter ; and from this again arises the unavoidable distraction of our thinking. Sometimes external impre3ON THE IMPERFECTIONS OF THE INTELLECT. 331