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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The secondary law-books of YAgiiavalkya and Narada describe five kinds of ordeals, and enter, the second more 1 VIII, 156-157. 9 VII, 127-128; VIII, 348. > VIII, 401-402. * VII, 139-142, 151-133. 4 VIII, 165. cil LAWS OF MANU. fully than the first, on descriptions of the manner in which they must be performed. Even the Vishzu-smvzti agrees with them, and the fragments of the lost metrical Smritis show that most of the latter, too, contained sections resembling those of Yagfiavalkya and Narada. It would be, in my opinion, a mistake to infer from the silence of Gautama, Baudhayana, and Vasish¢Za that in ancient times ordeals were unknown in India. Traces of such practices, which were formerly prevalent in various forms also among other Indo-European races, are found, as might be expected, even in Vedic works. If the authors of the Dharma-sitras ignore them or just indicate their existence, the correct explanation of this fact, too, is that they considered the subject not important enough for giving details, and left it to custom. The authors of the secondary Smrittis, as a matter of course, were anxious to fill up the blank left by their predecessors. But they probably did nothing more than bring the various local customs into a system which gradually was made more and more complete. Under these circumstances the fact that Manu’s rules stand midway between those of the Dharma-s(tras and of the other metrical law-books is another argument for allotting the first place to his Samhité. In the treatment of the civil and criminal law the inferiority of the Manu-sm7iti to the other Dharmasdstras of the same class, even to YAgiavalkya’s, which contains a much smaller number of verses on Vyavahara, manifests itself in various ways. In spite of the attempt at a scientific classification of the rules under certain heads, the arrangement of these sections is cumbrous and disorderly. Twice, at the end of the eighth and ninth chapters, we find collections of miscellaneous rules, which, as a comparison of the works of Y4gfiavalkya and Narada shows, might for the greater part have been easily fitted in to the one or the other of the eighteen titles. Under the single titles the rules are sometimes badly arranged. This is particularly visible in the chapter on inheritance, where, to mention only one most conspicuous instance of this want of care, the verse asserting the right of the mother and grandmother to take the estate of a predeceased son or grandson, INTRODUCTION. Cill
2This is particularly visible in the chapter on inheritance, where, to mention only one most conspicuous instance of this want of care, the verse asserting the right of the mother and grandmother to take the estate of a predeceased son or grandson, INTRODUCTION. Cill is placed so awkwardly that it is absolutely impossible to guess which place in the sequence of heirs the author meant to allot to them. As stated above, the verse most probably was inserted by the editor of the ancient Dharma-sitra. If he had cared at all for order and intelligibility, he ought not to have contented himself with the enunciation of the maxim that these persons do inherit, but he ought to have indicated where the preceding close series of heirs has to be broken in order to admit them. Very significant, too, are the constant mingling of moral exhortations with the legal rules and the occasional recommendation of quaint judicial devices which are common in the earlier stages of the development of the law. Though the duty of kings to protect their subjects and to restrain the wicked has been fully explained in the seventh chapter, yet in the sections on theft (VIII, 302-311), on violence (VIII, 343-347), and on adultery (VIII, 386-387), the author expatiates again and again on the necessity of eradicating such offences. In the second case the specific rules, providing for the punishment of sahasa crimes, are left out, the omission being repaired at the end of the ninth chapter. Both YAgviavalkya and Narada think it unnecessary to recur to the moral obligations of the king after pointing them out once. Both refrain also from mentioning the curious expedient which Manu recommends (VIII, 182-184) for the decision of doubtful disputes regarding deposits. Another important point is that Manu’s rules on some titles are exceedingly incomplete, and touch one particular case only, from which it is not always easy to deduce the general principle. Thus, in treating of the subtraction or resumption of gifts, Manu (VIII, 212-213) confines his remarks to pious gifts which are not applied in the manner stipulated. Yagviavalkya (II, 175-177) gives under this head at least some general principles, showing what is required for the validity of gifts; while Narada! offers a fairly full and systematic treatment of the whole law of gifts. A similarly gradual development is visible under other heads, especially concerns among 1 Professor Jolly’s Translation, pp. 59-60. civ LAWS OF MANU.
3offers a fairly full and systematic treatment of the whole law of gifts. A similarly gradual development is visible under other heads, especially concerns among 1 Professor Jolly’s Translation, pp. 59-60. civ LAWS OF MANU. partners and rescission of sale and purchase, the rules under which latter head Manu gives partly in their proper place and partly among the miscellaneous precepts at the end of the eighth chapter. A third point, finally, which deserves to be noted here, is the fact that legal definitions are almost entirely wanting in the Manu-smrcti, become more frequent in Y4gfavalkya’s work, and are regularly given by Nérada, as well as that many single rules which are common to Manu and Yagfavalkya, or to Manu, YAgviavalkya, and Narada, are framed in the latter works with much greater precision than in the former’, The inferiority of the Manusmrtti in all these points can only be explained by the assumption that it was composed at a time when the systematic treatment of the law had been begun, but had not reached a high state of perfection, while the superiority of the other metrical Smrtis permits us to infer that they belong to a much later period when the special law schools had made a considerable progress in the elaboration of their theories. This argument is, it seems to me, the strongest which can be brought forward as a firm basis for the universally prevalent belief of all European and Indian Sanskritists in the priority of our Manu to all other known secondary law-books. For wherever we are able to trace larger portions of the history of a special Br&éhmanical science, as e.g. in the case of grammar, we find that the later authors, though belonging to different schools and creeds, and though differing in the actual doctrines, invariably avail themselves of the method of their predecessors, developing and refining it more and more. Retrogressive steps, examples of which seem to occur in the handbooks of the Vedic schools?, have hitherto not been found’. All 1 Compare e. g. the rules regarding lawful interest, Manu VIII, 140-142, and YV4ga. II, 34. * Compare e. g. the case of the Gautamfya and Bandhdyanfya Dharma-sitras, where the second and later work is inferior in method to the earlier one. % Should it be objected that the Vishzu-smv7ti, though certainly younger than Manu’s and Yagfavalkya’s Dharmasdstras, is deficient in a systematic arrangement of the rules on civil and criminal law, the answer would be that the editor of this work appears to have been a Vaishwava sectarian, not an adherent of a school which made the law its special object of study. INTRODUCTION.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1The secondary law-books of YAgiiavalkya and Narada describe five kinds of ordeals, and enter, the second more 1 VIII, 156-157. 9 VII, 127-128; VIII, 348. > VIII, 401-402. * VII, 139-142, 151-133. 4 VIII, 165. cil LAWS OF MANU. fully than the first, on descriptions of the manner in which they must be performed. Even the Vishzu-smvzti agrees with them, and the fragments of the lost metrical Smritis show that most of the latter, too, contained sections resembling those of Yagfiavalkya and Narada. It would be, in my opinion, a mistake to infer from the silence of Gautama, Baudhayana, and Vasish¢Za that in ancient times ordeals were unknown in India. Traces of such practices, which were formerly prevalent in various forms also among other Indo-European races, are found, as might be expected, even in Vedic works. If the authors of the Dharma-sitras ignore them or just indicate their existence, the correct explanation of this fact, too, is that they considered the subject not important enough for giving details, and left it to custom. The authors of the secondary Smrittis, as a matter of course, were anxious to fill up the blank left by their predecessors. But they probably did nothing more than bring the various local customs into a system which gradually was made more and more complete. Under these circumstances the fact that Manu’s rules stand midway between those of the Dharma-s(tras and of the other metrical law-books is another argument for allotting the first place to his Samhité. In the treatment of the civil and criminal law the inferiority of the Manu-sm7iti to the other Dharmasdstras of the same class, even to YAgiavalkya’s, which contains a much smaller number of verses on Vyavahara, manifests itself in various ways. In spite of the attempt at a scientific classification of the rules under certain heads, the arrangement of these sections is cumbrous and disorderly. Twice, at the end of the eighth and ninth chapters, we find collections of miscellaneous rules, which, as a comparison of the works of Y4gfiavalkya and Narada shows, might for the greater part have been easily fitted in to the one or the other of the eighteen titles. Under the single titles the rules are sometimes badly arranged. This is particularly visible in the chapter on inheritance, where, to mention only one most conspicuous instance of this want of care, the verse asserting the right of the mother and grandmother to take the estate of a predeceased son or grandson, INTRODUCTION. Cill
2This is particularly visible in the chapter on inheritance, where, to mention only one most conspicuous instance of this want of care, the verse asserting the right of the mother and grandmother to take the estate of a predeceased son or grandson, INTRODUCTION. Cill is placed so awkwardly that it is absolutely impossible to guess which place in the sequence of heirs the author meant to allot to them. As stated above, the verse most probably was inserted by the editor of the ancient Dharma-sitra. If he had cared at all for order and intelligibility, he ought not to have contented himself with the enunciation of the maxim that these persons do inherit, but he ought to have indicated where the preceding close series of heirs has to be broken in order to admit them. Very significant, too, are the constant mingling of moral exhortations with the legal rules and the occasional recommendation of quaint judicial devices which are common in the earlier stages of the development of the law. Though the duty of kings to protect their subjects and to restrain the wicked has been fully explained in the seventh chapter, yet in the sections on theft (VIII, 302-311), on violence (VIII, 343-347), and on adultery (VIII, 386-387), the author expatiates again and again on the necessity of eradicating such offences. In the second case the specific rules, providing for the punishment of sahasa crimes, are left out, the omission being repaired at the end of the ninth chapter. Both YAgviavalkya and Narada think it unnecessary to recur to the moral obligations of the king after pointing them out once. Both refrain also from mentioning the curious expedient which Manu recommends (VIII, 182-184) for the decision of doubtful disputes regarding deposits. Another important point is that Manu’s rules on some titles are exceedingly incomplete, and touch one particular case only, from which it is not always easy to deduce the general principle. Thus, in treating of the subtraction or resumption of gifts, Manu (VIII, 212-213) confines his remarks to pious gifts which are not applied in the manner stipulated. Yagviavalkya (II, 175-177) gives under this head at least some general principles, showing what is required for the validity of gifts; while Narada! offers a fairly full and systematic treatment of the whole law of gifts. A similarly gradual development is visible under other heads, especially concerns among 1 Professor Jolly’s Translation, pp. 59-60. civ LAWS OF MANU.
3offers a fairly full and systematic treatment of the whole law of gifts. A similarly gradual development is visible under other heads, especially concerns among 1 Professor Jolly’s Translation, pp. 59-60. civ LAWS OF MANU. partners and rescission of sale and purchase, the rules under which latter head Manu gives partly in their proper place and partly among the miscellaneous precepts at the end of the eighth chapter. A third point, finally, which deserves to be noted here, is the fact that legal definitions are almost entirely wanting in the Manu-smrcti, become more frequent in Y4gfavalkya’s work, and are regularly given by Nérada, as well as that many single rules which are common to Manu and Yagfavalkya, or to Manu, YAgviavalkya, and Narada, are framed in the latter works with much greater precision than in the former’, The inferiority of the Manusmrtti in all these points can only be explained by the assumption that it was composed at a time when the systematic treatment of the law had been begun, but had not reached a high state of perfection, while the superiority of the other metrical Smrtis permits us to infer that they belong to a much later period when the special law schools had made a considerable progress in the elaboration of their theories. This argument is, it seems to me, the strongest which can be brought forward as a firm basis for the universally prevalent belief of all European and Indian Sanskritists in the priority of our Manu to all other known secondary law-books. For wherever we are able to trace larger portions of the history of a special Br&éhmanical science, as e.g. in the case of grammar, we find that the later authors, though belonging to different schools and creeds, and though differing in the actual doctrines, invariably avail themselves of the method of their predecessors, developing and refining it more and more. Retrogressive steps, examples of which seem to occur in the handbooks of the Vedic schools?, have hitherto not been found’. All 1 Compare e. g. the rules regarding lawful interest, Manu VIII, 140-142, and YV4ga. II, 34. * Compare e. g. the case of the Gautamfya and Bandhdyanfya Dharma-sitras, where the second and later work is inferior in method to the earlier one. % Should it be objected that the Vishzu-smv7ti, though certainly younger than Manu’s and Yagfavalkya’s Dharmasdstras, is deficient in a systematic arrangement of the rules on civil and criminal law, the answer would be that the editor of this work appears to have been a Vaishwava sectarian, not an adherent of a school which made the law its special object of study. INTRODUCTION.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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