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Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1XcIx the last links in a long chain of metrical recensions, there are several points which tend to show that our Manu-samhita is one of the first attempts at remodelling a Dharma-sitra. The most important argument for its comparatively early date is furnished by the incompleteness and awkwardness of its rules on judicial procedure and on civil law’. If we compare these rules with those of the Dharma-sitras and with those of the other metrical Smritis, they are somewhat more explicit than the former, but very much inferior to the latter. As regards procedure, the Manu-smriti pays more attention to the moral side of the duties, incumbent on the judge and the other persons concerned, than to the technicalities, which are much more clearly and minutely described in the Dharmasdstras of YA4giavalkya and Narada. In this respect it comes close to the Dharmasdtras, with which it particularly agrees in the absence of all mention of written plaints and of documentary evidence, as well as in the shortness of its remarks on ordeals. Among the ancient law-books the Vasish¢#a Dharmasdstra is the only one which has allusions to written documents, and names them, XVI, 10, 14-15, as one of the means of legal proof. In the other Dharma-sitras there is no indication that their authors were acquainted with the art of writing. I have already pointed out in the Introduction to my translation of Vasisht#a? that most probably this omission has to be explained not by the assumption that in the times of Gautama, Baudhdyana, and Apastamba writing was unknown or little used in India, but by the consideration that the general character of the Dharma-sftras, which principally pay attention to the moral side of the law, does not require the introduction of matters belonging more properly to the customs of the country or to the Arthas4stra. Whatever may be thought of the prevalence of writing during the earlier times and of the value of my explanation, it may be regarded as perfectly certain that 1 See on this subject and the following discussion, Weber, History of Indian Literature, pp. 279-281; Stenzler, Yagfavalkya, pp. vii-x ; Journal of the German Or. Soc. vol. ix, on the Indian Ordeals ; and Jolly, Tagore Lectures, pp. 45-49. 2 Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvi, p. xxvi. g2 ¢c LAWS OF MANU.
2279-281; Stenzler, Yagfavalkya, pp. vii-x ; Journal of the German Or. Soc. vol. ix, on the Indian Ordeals ; and Jolly, Tagore Lectures, pp. 45-49. 2 Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvi, p. xxvi. g2 ¢c LAWS OF MANU. Bhvigu’s Manu-samhit4 belongs to a period when the art of writing was known and generally practised. For, first, we find two clear references to written documents, ‘what has been caused to be written by force’ (lekhita, VIII, 168) and royal edicts (sésana, IX, 232). Secondly, we have the expression nibandh, ‘to record,’ in a passage (VIII, 255) where the context leaves no doubt that a written entry is referred to. When it is said there, that in a boundarydispute the king shall record the boundary, according to the unanimous declaration of the witnesses, together with their names, it is impossible to imagine how he can do so without drawing up a written document, which, of a necessity, must have legal force for the future. This use of the verb nibandh makes it further probable that Medhatithi is not altogether wrong, when he explains (VIII, 76) the compound anibaddhaZ/, ‘a person not appointed (to be a witness to a transaction),’ by ‘a person not entered (as a witness in the document), and refers the rule to cases of loans and other commercial transactions. Thirdly, there is the term karawa (VIII, 54 and 154), which, though less explicit, likewise points to the use of written bonds for loans. The former passage declares that ‘a debt which is proved by karava’ (karazena vibh4vitam) must be paid, and the commentators explain karaza to mean ‘written bonds, witnesses, and so forth.’ Hence it has been rendered in the translation by ‘ good evidence.’ Verse 154 prescribes that a debtor ‘who, unable to pay a debt (at the fixed time), wishes to make a new contract, may renew (lit. change) the karazam (karazam parivartayet').’ Two commentators, Kullika and Raghava, take the word here in the sense of ‘a written bond, while the older ones, Govinda, Naradyaza, and probably also Medh§atithi, explain it by ‘bonds and so forth,’ and make it include agreements before witnesses. From these explanations and the use of the word karaza in other legal works it would appear that karaza may also be cited as a witness for the acquaintance of our author with the art of writing. To the conclusion that writing must have been extensively used in business- 1 Nandana’s reading karavam is clearly erroneous; see below, p. cxxxiv. INTRODUCTION. ci
3To the conclusion that writing must have been extensively used in business- 1 Nandana’s reading karavam is clearly erroneous; see below, p. cxxxiv. INTRODUCTION. ci dealings points, finally, the whole state of civilisation to which Manu’s rules are adapted. The highly developed trade by land and by sea’, on which ad valorem duties were imposed?, the existence of official lists of prices which were renewed periodically’, the complicated system of calculations of interest, among which we find compound interest‘, and the occurrence of mortgages5, would be impossible without written documents. These facts appear to me so eloquent that even though all the passages adduced above, which explicitly mention written documents, could be proved to be late interpolations, the general aspect of this question would remain unchanged. If, under these circumstances, Manu’s rules on evidence contain nothing definite on the admissibility of documents, and if he agrees in this particular with the Dharma-sitras and differs strongly from the Dharmasdstras of Yagravalkya and Narada as well as other metrical Smritis, this omission gains a great importance for the historical position of the Samhita. Whether we explain it by an oversight of the editor or by the assumption that he left the determination of the value of written documents to custom or to another Sastra, it shows that he was acquainted with the Dharmasitras alone or with Dharma-sQtras and such metrical Smritis as excluded the section on documents. As he certainly was an adherent of a special law school, and bent on making his work as complete as possible, he would not have omitted so important a point if he had known lawbooks like the Yagfiavalkya-smriti. The omission of the details regarding ordeals is no less significant. Manu VIII, 109-116 describes only the administration of oaths more fully, and mentions the ordeals by fire and water in a cursory manner. Among the Dharma-sitras there is only the Apastambiya which (II, 29, 6) recommends the employment of divine proof (daiva) or ordeals in a general way without adding any particulars. The secondary law-books of YAgiiavalkya and Narada describe five kinds of ordeals, and enter, the second more 1 VIII, 156-157. 9 VII, 127-128; VIII, 348. > VIII, 401-402. * VII, 139-142, 151-133. 4 VIII, 165. cil LAWS OF MANU.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
Romanised transliteration as printed by the translator, not the original script. This is what we hold.
1XcIx the last links in a long chain of metrical recensions, there are several points which tend to show that our Manu-samhita is one of the first attempts at remodelling a Dharma-sitra. The most important argument for its comparatively early date is furnished by the incompleteness and awkwardness of its rules on judicial procedure and on civil law’. If we compare these rules with those of the Dharma-sitras and with those of the other metrical Smritis, they are somewhat more explicit than the former, but very much inferior to the latter. As regards procedure, the Manu-smriti pays more attention to the moral side of the duties, incumbent on the judge and the other persons concerned, than to the technicalities, which are much more clearly and minutely described in the Dharmasdstras of YA4giavalkya and Narada. In this respect it comes close to the Dharmasdtras, with which it particularly agrees in the absence of all mention of written plaints and of documentary evidence, as well as in the shortness of its remarks on ordeals. Among the ancient law-books the Vasish¢#a Dharmasdstra is the only one which has allusions to written documents, and names them, XVI, 10, 14-15, as one of the means of legal proof. In the other Dharma-sitras there is no indication that their authors were acquainted with the art of writing. I have already pointed out in the Introduction to my translation of Vasisht#a? that most probably this omission has to be explained not by the assumption that in the times of Gautama, Baudhdyana, and Apastamba writing was unknown or little used in India, but by the consideration that the general character of the Dharma-sftras, which principally pay attention to the moral side of the law, does not require the introduction of matters belonging more properly to the customs of the country or to the Arthas4stra. Whatever may be thought of the prevalence of writing during the earlier times and of the value of my explanation, it may be regarded as perfectly certain that 1 See on this subject and the following discussion, Weber, History of Indian Literature, pp. 279-281; Stenzler, Yagfavalkya, pp. vii-x ; Journal of the German Or. Soc. vol. ix, on the Indian Ordeals ; and Jolly, Tagore Lectures, pp. 45-49. 2 Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvi, p. xxvi. g2 ¢c LAWS OF MANU.
2279-281; Stenzler, Yagfavalkya, pp. vii-x ; Journal of the German Or. Soc. vol. ix, on the Indian Ordeals ; and Jolly, Tagore Lectures, pp. 45-49. 2 Sacred Books of the East, vol. xvi, p. xxvi. g2 ¢c LAWS OF MANU. Bhvigu’s Manu-samhit4 belongs to a period when the art of writing was known and generally practised. For, first, we find two clear references to written documents, ‘what has been caused to be written by force’ (lekhita, VIII, 168) and royal edicts (sésana, IX, 232). Secondly, we have the expression nibandh, ‘to record,’ in a passage (VIII, 255) where the context leaves no doubt that a written entry is referred to. When it is said there, that in a boundarydispute the king shall record the boundary, according to the unanimous declaration of the witnesses, together with their names, it is impossible to imagine how he can do so without drawing up a written document, which, of a necessity, must have legal force for the future. This use of the verb nibandh makes it further probable that Medhatithi is not altogether wrong, when he explains (VIII, 76) the compound anibaddhaZ/, ‘a person not appointed (to be a witness to a transaction),’ by ‘a person not entered (as a witness in the document), and refers the rule to cases of loans and other commercial transactions. Thirdly, there is the term karawa (VIII, 54 and 154), which, though less explicit, likewise points to the use of written bonds for loans. The former passage declares that ‘a debt which is proved by karava’ (karazena vibh4vitam) must be paid, and the commentators explain karaza to mean ‘written bonds, witnesses, and so forth.’ Hence it has been rendered in the translation by ‘ good evidence.’ Verse 154 prescribes that a debtor ‘who, unable to pay a debt (at the fixed time), wishes to make a new contract, may renew (lit. change) the karazam (karazam parivartayet').’ Two commentators, Kullika and Raghava, take the word here in the sense of ‘a written bond, while the older ones, Govinda, Naradyaza, and probably also Medh§atithi, explain it by ‘bonds and so forth,’ and make it include agreements before witnesses. From these explanations and the use of the word karaza in other legal works it would appear that karaza may also be cited as a witness for the acquaintance of our author with the art of writing. To the conclusion that writing must have been extensively used in business- 1 Nandana’s reading karavam is clearly erroneous; see below, p. cxxxiv. INTRODUCTION. ci
3To the conclusion that writing must have been extensively used in business- 1 Nandana’s reading karavam is clearly erroneous; see below, p. cxxxiv. INTRODUCTION. ci dealings points, finally, the whole state of civilisation to which Manu’s rules are adapted. The highly developed trade by land and by sea’, on which ad valorem duties were imposed?, the existence of official lists of prices which were renewed periodically’, the complicated system of calculations of interest, among which we find compound interest‘, and the occurrence of mortgages5, would be impossible without written documents. These facts appear to me so eloquent that even though all the passages adduced above, which explicitly mention written documents, could be proved to be late interpolations, the general aspect of this question would remain unchanged. If, under these circumstances, Manu’s rules on evidence contain nothing definite on the admissibility of documents, and if he agrees in this particular with the Dharma-sitras and differs strongly from the Dharmasdstras of Yagravalkya and Narada as well as other metrical Smritis, this omission gains a great importance for the historical position of the Samhita. Whether we explain it by an oversight of the editor or by the assumption that he left the determination of the value of written documents to custom or to another Sastra, it shows that he was acquainted with the Dharmasitras alone or with Dharma-sQtras and such metrical Smritis as excluded the section on documents. As he certainly was an adherent of a special law school, and bent on making his work as complete as possible, he would not have omitted so important a point if he had known lawbooks like the Yagfiavalkya-smriti. The omission of the details regarding ordeals is no less significant. Manu VIII, 109-116 describes only the administration of oaths more fully, and mentions the ordeals by fire and water in a cursory manner. Among the Dharma-sitras there is only the Apastambiya which (II, 29, 6) recommends the employment of divine proof (daiva) or ordeals in a general way without adding any particulars. The secondary law-books of YAgiiavalkya and Narada describe five kinds of ordeals, and enter, the second more 1 VIII, 156-157. 9 VII, 127-128; VIII, 348. > VIII, 401-402. * VII, 139-142, 151-133. 4 VIII, 165. cil LAWS OF MANU.
The source text as printed, transcribed diplomatically. Where the source language uses a non-Latin script that reaches us only through a Victorian romanisation, this layer is labelled transliteration, because that is what we hold.
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