The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

We know that multiplicity in general is necessarily conditioned by space and time, and is only thinkable in them. In this respect they are called the principium individuationis. But we have found that space and time are forms of the principle of sufficient reason.

In this principle all our knowledge a priori is expressed, but, as we showed above, this a priori knowledge, as such, only applies to the knowableness of things, not to the things themselves, i.e., it is only our form of knowledge, it is not a property of the thing-iu- itself. The thing-initself is, as such, free from all forms of knowledge, even the most universal, that of being an object for the subject.

In other words, the thing-in-itself is something altogether different from the idea. If, now, this thingin-itself is the will, as I believe I have fully and~c6rrvmmn^jr proved iF to be, then, regarded as such and apart from its manifestation, it lies outside time and space, and therefore knows no multiplicity, and is consequently one.

Yet, as I have said, it is not one in the sense in which an individual or a concept is one, but as something to which the condition of the possibility of multiplicity, the principium individuationis, is foreign.

The multiplicity of things in space and time, which collectively constitute the objectification of will, does not affect the will itself, which remains indivisible notwithstanding it It_is not the case that, in some way or other, a smaller part of will is in the stone and a larger part in the man, for the relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space, and has no longer any meaning when we go beyond this form of intuition or perception.

The more and the less have application only to the phenomenon of will, that is, its visibility, its objectiTi cation. Of this there is a higher grade in the plant than in the^tone ; in the animal a higher grade than in the plant : indeed, the passage of will into visibility, its

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objectification, has grades as innumerable as exist between the dimmest twilight and the briglitest sunshineT the loudest sound and the faintest eclio. We shall return later to the consideration of these grades of visibility which belong to the objectification of the will, to the reflection of its nature. But as the grades of its objectification do not directly concern the will itself, still less is it concerned by the multiplicity of the phenomena of these different grades, i.e., the multitude of individuals of each form, or the particular manifestations of each force. For this multiplicity is directly conditioned by time and space, into which the will itself never enters. The will reveals itself as completely and as much in one oak as in millions. Their number and multiplication in space and time has no meaning with regard to it, but only with regard to the multiplicity of individuals who know in space and time, and who are themselves multiplied and dispersed in these. The multiplicity of these individuals itself belongs not to the will, but only to its manifestation. We may therefore say that if, per impossihile, a single real existence^ even most insignificant, were to be entirely annihilated, the whole world would necessarily jerish with it The great mystic Angetus Silesius feels this when he says-

“I know God cannot live an instant without me,

He must give up the ghost if 1 should cease to be.”

Men have tried in various ways to bring the immeasurable greatness of the material universe nearer to the comprehension of us all, and then they have seized the opportunity to make edifying remarks. They have referred perhaps to the relative smallness of the earth, and indeed of man ; or, on the contrary, they have pointed out the greatness of the mind of this man who is so insignificantthe mind that can solve, comprehend, and even measure the greatness of the universe, and so forth. NoWj dl this is very well, but to me, when I consider the vftsti68

THE WORLD AS WILL.

BK. II.

ness of the world, the most important point is this, that t^e" thing-in-itself, whose manifestation is the world — whatever else it may be — cannot have its true self spread ouTandT dispersed after this fashion in boundless space, hut that this endless extension belongs only to its manifestation. The thing-in-itself, on the contrary, is present entire and undivided in every object of nature and in every living being. Therefore we lose nothing by standing still beside any single individual thing, and true wisdom is not to be gained by measuring out the boundless world, or, what would be more to the purpose, by actually traversing endless space. It is rather to be attained by the thorough investigation of any individual thing, for thus we seek to arrive at a full knowledge and understanding of its true and peculiar nature.