The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

attention to it, yet it will^not prevent the individual from being~seized with the f^r of dea^tfi,7aii3 tr^g in'" every way to escape from it, when it presents itself to him m some particular real ^se, pr^eyen _only in his imagination, ^d he is compelled to contemplate it for just as, so long as his knowledge was directed t^Tife as such, he was obliged to recognise imnioftffi^ in it, to 'wKen' dealh is brought before his eyes, he is obliged to recognise it as that vvdiich it is, the temporal end of the particular temporal phenomenon. What we fear in 3eath~l3 by no means the pain, for it lies clearly oil this S3e of death, and, moreover^ we bfteh take refuge in death from pain, just as, on the contrary, we soruetimes endure the mo3t~!eai1uT~suHe^rlhg~mereTirto' escape^ for a while, although it would be quick and easy. Thug we distinguish pain and deathjas' two^ entirelj" different evils. What we fear in death is the end of the individual^ which it openly professes itself to be, and since the individual is a particular objectification of the will to live itself, its whole nature struggles against death. Now 2when feeling thus exposes ms .helpless, re^^^^ can yet step in and for the most part overcome its adverse influence, for it places us upon a higher standpoint, from which we no longer contemplate the particular but the whole. Therefore a philosophical Imowledge of the nature of the world, which extended to the point we have now feai^J in liEls worlc but went no farther, could even at this point of view overcome the terror of de^h in the measure In which" refiectldh^ad power over direct feeling in the given individual!^ K man who had thoroughly assiniilatod the truths wehave alreacTy advanced, huthad not come to know, either from his own experience or from a deeper insight, that constant suffering is essent^ to Mfe, wEgTfejg^^^a'tMactipbr life, and could calmly and deliberately d.esire toat ^

life, as he had hitbeita. knoHm it.. shniild p.nt^nrf} for ever 6r^ repeat itself ever anew^ and whose love of life was so OTearXliaTTie willingly and gladly accepted ^ tKeTiard^ ships and miseries to which it is exposed for the sake of its pleasures, — such a man would stand with firm-knit

have nothing to fear. Armed with the knowledge we have "given him, he would await with indifference the death that*Tiastens towards him on the wings of time. He would regard it as a false illusion, an impotent i^ectre, ^ictr^rl^tens the weak hut lias ^ power over him who knows that he is himself the will of which the whole 3world is the objectification or copy, and that therefore ^ is always certain of life, and also of the present, the peculiar and only form of the phenomenon of the will. He could not be terrified by an endless past or future in which he would not be, fcr'thB'nâe~wouldniegar(r"S the emj)ty deTusio1tr“6rth§ wetT CT ' Maya.” ’ "Thus" Fe would no" mdf^lear"^atET]^h tl^^ fears tbie ulghE" lh~ the “ Bhagavad-Gita” Krishna thus raises the mind of his young pupir Arjuna, when, seized with cpmpimction at the_sight of th^ arrayed hosts (somewhat as Xerxes was), he loses heart and desires to give up the battle in order to avert the death of so uiany thousands. Krishna leads him to this point of view, and the death of those thousands can hoTonger restrain him ; he gives the sign for battle. This pomf df view is~ also expressed by Go^he’s Prometheus, especially when he says —

“ Here sit I, form mankind In my own image,

A race like to myself,

To suffer and to weep, Kejoice, enjoy,

And heed thee not.

The plulosophjMaOtunQ. jjt, lead any one to this point of view whose conviction waaTHE ASSERTION AND DENIAL OF THE WILL. ^67 not shaken and weakened by their errors and imperfectiohs. of Bruno has properly no ethical theory at all, aiTd tiig^y^eoiy contained in the philosophy of Spinoza does not really proceed from the inner nature of his doctrine, but is merely tacked on to it by means of weak and palpable sophisms, though in itself jt is praiseworthy and f)eautifuL Finally, there are many men who would occupy this point of view if their knowledge kept pace with their will, t.e., if, free from all illusion, they were in a position to become clearly and distinctly themselves. For this is, for knowledge, the point of view of the complete assertion of ihe wU,l to live.