The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

TSiit this is just the state which I described above as necessary for the knowledge of the Idea, as pure c(mtemplation, as sinking onesel£iii--perception. losing oneself in the "objec^fOTgetting all individuality, surrendering that Knd of knowledge \^ich follows the principle of suffiiJlSSTTcaibhy andcoffprehends. only f^ations^ the stale by meahsTpf’whii^i at once and inseparably the perceived parSculai thing is raised to the Idea of its whole species, ancflilie “knowing individual to the pure subject of willTHE PLATONIC IDEA :p. 255

Less knowledge, and aa such they are both taken out of bhe atream oftime and all other^elatiODs. It is then all one whether we see the sun set from the prMon 05.

EEe palace.

Inward disposition, the predominance of knowing over willing, can produce this state under any circumstances. This is shown by those .admirable Dutch . artists who directed this purely objective perception to the most insignificant objects, and ^^blished a lasting monument of their objectivity and spiritual peace in their pictures of stUl life., which the aesthetic beholder does not look on without emotion ; for they present to him the peaceful still, frame of mind of the artist, free from will, which w^ ne^ed to contemplate such insignificant things so o^ectively, to observe them so attentively, and to repeat this perception so intelligently - and ^ the picture enables the onlbok^ fb participate in this state^ his emotion is often increased by the contrast between it and the un- ^iet frame of mind, disturbed by vehement willing, in which he finds himself. In the same spirit, landscapepainters, and particularly Kuisdael, have often painted very insignificant country scenes, which produce the sanw effect even more agreeahly,

AH this is accomplished by the inner power of an artistic nature alone ; but that purely objective disposition is facilitated and assisted from without by suitable objects, by the abundance of natural beauty which invites contemplation, and even presses itself upon us. Whenever it discloses itself suddenly to our view, it almost always succeeds in delivering us, though it may be only for a moment, from subjectivity, from the slavery of the will, and in raising us to the state of pure knowing. This is why the man who is tormented by passion, or want, or care, is so suddenly revived, cheered, and restored by a single free glance into nature : the storm of passion, the pressure of desire and fear, and all the miseries of willing are then at once, and in a marvellous manner,

THE WORLD ^5 IDEA.

BK. III.

p. 256

calmed and appeased. For at the moment at which, freed from the will, we give ourselves up to pure willless knowing, we pass into a world from which everything is absent that influenced our will and moved us so violently through it.

Tliis freeing of knowledge lifts us as wholly and entire^ away from alT that, as do sleep and dreams j happiness and unhappiness have disappeared ; we are no longer individual j the individual is fdrgoften ; we are only pure subject of knowledge ; we are only that <ww_eye of the world which looks out from jail knowing cre^ures, but which can become perfectly free from the service of will in man alone.

Thus all difl’erence of individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the same whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar; for neither joy nor complaining can pass that boundary with us.

So near us always lies a sphere in which we escape from all our misSy ; hut wTib has^he strehgth'lo’cdhlinue Tong lu'ifT As soon as any mh^e relation to our wilT, to”our"peTsoni even of these objects of our pure contemplation, cbmes 8^am into consciousness, the magic is at an end; we fall back into the Tcnowledge which is governed by the principle of sufficient reason ; we know no longer the Idea, but the particular thing, the link of a chain to which we also belong, and we are again abandoned to all our woe.

Most men remain almost always at this standpoint because they entirely lack objectivity, i.e., genius. Therefore they have no pleasure in being alone with nature; they need con^any, or at least a book.

For their knowledge remains subject to their will ; they seek, therefore, in objects, only some relation to their will, and whenever they see anything that has no such relation, there sounds within them, like a ground bass in music, the constant inconsolable cry, “ It is of no use to me ; " thus in solitude the most beautiful surroundings have for them a desolate, dWk, strahge,"and hostile appearance.