The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

We see, from what has been said, that the madman hasp. 251 a true knowledge of what is actually present, and also of certain particulars of the past, but that he mistakes the connection, the relations, and therefore falls into error and talks nonsense. Now this is exactly the point at which he comes into contact with the man of genius ; for he also leaves out of sight the knowledge of the connection of things, since he neglects that knowledge of relations which conforms to the principle of sufficient reason, in order to see in things only their Ideas, and to seek to comprehend their true nature, which manifests itself to perception, and in regard to which one thinff represents its whole species, in which way, as Goethe says, one case is valid for a thousand. The particular object of his contemplation, or the present which is perceived by him with extraordinary vividness, appear in so strong a light that the other links of the chain to which they belong are at once thrown into the shade, and this gives rise to phenomena which have long been recognised as resembling those of madness. That which in particular given things exists only incompletely and weakened by modifications, is raised by the man of genius, through his way of contemplating it, to the Idea of the thing, to completeness : he therefore sees everywhere extremes, and therefore his own action tends to extremes ; he cannot hit the mean, he lacks soberness, and the result is what we have said. He knows the Ideas completely but not the individuals. Therefore it has been said that a poet may know mankind deeply and thoroughly, and may yet have a very imperfect knowledge of men. He is easily deceived^ and is a tool in the hands of the cmf^.

I 37. Genius, then, consists, according to our explanation, in the capacity for knowing, independently of the principle of sufficient reason, not individual things, which have their existence only in their relations, but the Ideas of such things, and of being oneself the correlative of the Idea, and thus no longer an individual, but the pure subject of knowledge. Yet this faculty must exist in all

*5*

THE WORLD AS IDEA.

BK. Ill

men in a smaller and different degree ; for if not, they would be just as incapable of enjoying works of art as of prodnHng~THe'm7 tTTiey would have no suscej^IHIity the beautifuTor the suBlime ; indeed, these words could have'no meaning for them.

We must therefore assume TEat there exists in all men this power of knowing the Idea^in things, and consequehtljrbFtianscending tKeir personality for the moment, unless indeed there are some nien who are ^paBIe^ of no aesthetic pleasure at alt THe man of gemuF^xcels ~ br3rnafy~ men onIy~hy possessing this kind of knowledge in a far higher degree and more continuously.

Thus, while under its influence he retains the presence of mind which is necessary to enable him to repeat in a voluntary and intentional work what he has learned in this manner ; and this repetition is the work of art. Through this he communicates to others the Idea he has grasped.

This Idea remains unchanged and the same, so that aesthetic pleasure is one and the same whether it is called forth by a work of art or directly by the contemplation of nature and life. The work of art is only a means of facilitating the knowledge in which this pleasure consists.

That the Idea comes to us more easily from the work of art than directly from nature and the real world, arises from the fact that the artist, who knew only the Idea, no longer the actual, has reproduced in his work the pure Idea, has abstracted it from the actual, omitting all disturbing accidents. The artist lets us see the wprM . through That he has these