The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
reason is and what it can do.
But although it may to a certain extent be possible to attain that jnd through the application of reason, and~£Efough a purely rational syst^ of ethids, anff although experience shows that the Happie^ men are those purely rational characters comSionly called practical philosophers, — and rightly so, because just as the tru^, that Ts,”tlie theoretical plulospher gglifi^nire^ into the concept, they carry the concept jntp life, — yet it is far from the case that perfection can be attmne^in this way, and that the reason, rightly used, can really free us from the burden and sorrow .of , life»^d lead us to happiness.
Bather, there lies an absolute contradiction in wishing to live without suffering, and this contradiction is also implied in the commonly used expression, “ blessed life. This will become perfectly clear to whoever comprehends the whole of the following exposition.
In this purely rational system of ethics the contradiction reveals itself thus, the Stoic is obliged in his doctrine of the way to the blessed life (for that is what his ethical system always remains) to insert a recommendation of suicide (as among the magnificent ornaments and apparel of Eastern despots there is always a costly vial of poison) for the case in which the sufferings of the body, which cannot be philosophised away by any 'pfihcr]^es“br syllogistic reasonings, are paramount and incurable ; thus its one aim, blessedness, is rendered vain, and nothing rSmains as a mode of escape from sufferuig except deatt^; in such a case then death must be voluntarily accepted, just as we would take any other medicine.
Here then a marked antagonism is brought out between the ethical system of Stoicism and all those systems referred to above which make virtue in itself directly, and accompanied by the most grievous sorrows, their ami, and will not allow a man to end his life in order to escape from suffering.
Not one of them, however, was able to give the true reason for the rejection of suicide, but they laboriously collected illusory explanations from all sides : the true iZOTHE WORLD .45 IDEA. reason will appear in the Fourth Book in the coTuae of the development of our system. But the antagonism referred to reveals and establishes the essential difference in fundamental principle between Stoicism, which is just a special form of endaemonism, and those doctrines we have mentioned, although both are often at one in their results, and are apparently related. And the inner contradiction referred to above, with which the ethical system of Stoicism is affected even in its fundamental thought, shows itself further in the circumstance that its ideal, the Stoic philosopher, as the system itself represents him, could never obtain life or inner poetic truth, but remains a wooden, stiff lay-figure of which nothing can be made. He cannot himself make use of his wisdom, and his perfect peace, contentment, and blessedness directly contradict the nature of man, and preclude us from forming any concrete idea of him. When compared with him, how entirely Afferent appear the overcomers of the world, and voluntary hermits that Indian philosophy presents to us, and has actually produced; or indeed, the holy man of Christianity, that excellent form full of deep life, of the greatest poetic truth, and the highest significance, which stands before us in perfect virtue, holiness, and sublimity, yet in a state of supreme suffering.^
^ Of. Ch. 1 6 of Supplement.
iifroutr Uooft.
ThE WORLD AS WILL.
FIRST ASPECT.
THE OBJECTIFICATION OP THE WTI.V
Nos buobitat, non tartura, sed nec sidera cc«»ll » m Aobis ^ai iUa laciv.
K «a3 I
II.
§ 17. In the first book we considered the idea merely as such, that is, only according to its general form. It is true that as far as the abstract idea, the concept, is concerned, we obtained a knowledge of it in respect of its content also, because it has content and meaning only in relation to die idea of perception, without which it would be worthless and empty. Accordingly, directing our attention exclusively to the idea of perception, we shall now endeavour to arrive at a knowledge of its content, its more exact definition, and the forms which it presents to us. And it will specially interest us to find an explanation of its peculiar significance, that significtiiice which is otherwise merely felt, but on account of which it is that these pictures do not pass by us entirely stiange an4 meauiugless. a.s they must otherwise do, but speak to us directly, are understood, and obtain an interest which concerns our whole nature.
We direct our attention to mathematics, natural science, and philosophy, for each of these holds out the hope that it will afford us a part of the explanation we desire. Now, taking philosophy first, we find that it is like a monster with many heads, each of which speaks a Afferent language. They are not, indeed, all at variance on the point we are here considering, the significance of the idea of perception. ) For, with the exception of the Sceptics and the Idealists, the others, for the most part, speak very much in the same way of an object which constitutes the basis of the idea, and which is indeed different in its whole being and nature from the idea, but yet is in all
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THE WORLD AS WILL.
BK. II.
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