The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

vehemence of his own will, the intensity with which he has seized upon life and attached himself closely to it, even that life whose terrible side he sees before him in the misery of those who are oppressed by him, and with which he is yet so firmly united, that just on this account the greatest atrocity proceeds from him himself, as a means for the fuller assertion of his own will He recognises himself as the concentrated manifestation of the will to live, feels to what degree he is given up to life, and with it also to innumerable sufferings which are essential to it, for it has infinite time and infinite space to abolish the distinction between the possible and the actual, and to change all the sufferings which as yet are merely known to him into sufferings he has experienced.

The millions of years of constant rebirth certainly exist, like the whole past and future, only in conception ; occupied time, the form of the phenomenon of the win, is only the present, and fur the individual time is ever new : it seems to him always as if he had newly come into being. For life is inseparable from the will to live, and the only form of life is the present.

Death (the repetition of the comparison must be excused) is like the setting of the sun, which is only apparentlj^ §wailowed~~u]^by lire' 'lilght. "but. .juL^ealTty, itself tht source of all light^ Jmrn^ without intermission, brings new day£ to new worlds, is"^aTvvays rising^ 'and' always setting. Beginning, and end only concern the individual through time, the form of the phenomenon for the idea.

Outside time lies only the will, Kant^jtbingdjniteeTf^ and its adequate objectifica$iQiuJhfiL-JdgaL.-d-aa^ Bierefore suicide affords np escape; what evCTy one it hisTnmost~ consciousnessjKiil^tha^^ every one ^jT^at he wills. „ Thus, besides the merely fell knowledge of the Ulusiveness and nothingness of the forms of the idea which separate individuals, it is the self-knowledge of one’s own will and its degree that gives the sting to conscienca The course of life draws

p. 474

THE WORLD WILL.

BK. IV.

the image of the empirical character, whose original is the intelligible character, and horrifies the wicked man by this image. He is horrified all the same whether the image is depicted in large characters, so that the world shares his horror, or in such small ones that he alone sees it, for it only concerns him directly. The past would be a matter of indifference, and could not pain the conscience if the character did not feel itself free from all time and unalterable by it, so long as it does not deny itself. Therefore things which are long past still weigh on the conscience. The prayer, “ Lead me not into temptation/’ means, “Let me not see what manner of person I am.” _ In the might with which the bad man asserts life, and which exhibits itself to him in the sufferings which he inflicts on others, he measures how far he is from the surrender and denial of that will, the only possible deliverance from the world and its miseries. He sees how far he belongs to it, and how firmly he is bound to it ; the hnonjon suffering of others has no power to move him ; he is given up to life and felt suffering. It remains hidden whether this wiU ever break and overcome the vehemence of his will.

This exposition of the significance and inner nature of the had, which as mere feeling, i.e., not as distinct, abstract knowledge, is the content of remorse, will gain distinctness and completeness by the similar consideration of the good as a quality of human will, and finally of absolute resignation and holiness, which proceeds from it when it has attained its highest grade. For opposites Sjlws^s throw light upon each other, and the day at. once reveals both itseiranff;^e1m^tlMSpmftzâAd^¥flJd^

§ 66. A theory of morals without proof, that is, mere moralising, can effect nothing, because it does not act as a motive. A theory of morals which does act as a motive can do so only by working on self-love. But what springs from this source has no moral worth. It follows from this that no genuine virtue can be producedp. 475 through moral theory or abstract knowledge in general, but that such virtue must spring &om that intuitive knowledge which recognises in the hidividuality of others the same nature as in our owil