The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

For motives to act, it is necessary not only that they should be present, but that they should be known ; for, according to a very good expression of the schoolmen, which we referred to once before, causa Jmalis movet non secu/ndum mum csss reale; sed secundum esse cognitum. For example, in order that the relation may appear that exists in a given man between egoism and sympathy, it is not sufficient that he should possess wealth

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and see others in want, but he must also know what he can do with his wealth, both for himself and for others: not only must the suffering of others be presented to him, but he must know both what suffering and also what pleasure is.

Perhaps, on a first occasion, he did not know edl this so well as on a second ; and if, on a similar occasion, he acts differently, this arises simply from the fact that the circumstances were really different, as regards the part of them that depends on his knowing them, although they seem to be the same.

As ignorance of actually existing circumstances robs them of their influence, so, on the other hand, entirely imaginary circumstances may act as if they were real, not only in the case of a particular deception, but also in general and continuously.

For example, if a man is firmly persuaded that every good action will be repaid him a hundredfold in a future life, such a conviction affects him in precisely the same way as a good bill of exchange at a very long date, and he can give from mere egoism, as from another point of view he would take from egoism. He has not changed himself: velle non discitur.

It is on account of this great influence of knowledge upon action, while the will remains unchangeable, that the character develops and its different features appear only little by little. Therefore it shows itself different at every period of life, and an impetuous, wild youth may be succeeded by a staid, sober, manly age.

Especially what is bad in the character will always come out more strongly with time, yet sometimes it occurs that passions which a man gave way to in his youth are afterwards voluntarily restrained, simply because the motives opposed to them have only then come into knowledge.

Hence, also, we are all innocent to begin with, and this merely means that neither we nor others know the evil of our own nature ; it only appears with the motives, and only in time do the motives appear in knowledge.

Eepentance never proceeds from a change of the will (which is impossible), but from a change of knowledge. The essential and peculiar in what I have always willed I must still continue to will; for I myself am this vnll which lies outside time and change. I can therefore never_repent of what I have willed, though I can repent of what I have done; because, led by false conceptions, I did something that was not in conformity with my will.

The disco ve^ Of this through fuller kimwledge is repmta'Mt. This extends not merely to worldly wisdom, to the choice of the means, and the judgment of the appropriateness of the end to my own will, but also to what is properly ethical.

For example, I may have acted more egotistically than is in accordance vnth my character, led astray by exaggerated ideas of the need in which I myself stood, or of the craft, falseness, and wickedness of others, or because I hurried too much, i.e., acted without deliberation, determined not by motives distinctly known in abstracto, but by merely perceived motives, by the present and the emotion which it excited, and which was so strong that I had not properly the use of my reason ; but the return of reflection is thus here also merely corrected knowledge, and from this repentance may proceed, which always proclaims itself by niaking amends for the past, as far as is possible.

Yet it must be observed that, in order to deceive themselves, men prearrange what seem to be hasty errors, but are really secretly considered actions. For we deceive and flatter no one through such fine devices as ourselves. The converse of the case we have given may also occur.

I may be misled by too good an opinion of others, or want of knowledge of the relative value of the good things of life, or some abstract dogma in which I have since lost faith, and thus I may act less egotistically than is in