The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

as it were merely by accident, as the means, not as the eiid^ Therefore the ethical theory of Stoicism is in its whole nature and point of view fundamentally different from the ethical systems which lay stress direct^ u;^n virtue, such as the" ddctrlhes ~bT 'the Tedas, of Plato, of CBrrstianity7an3~6f~Kant.

The aim of Stoical ethics T^s happiness : reXo? to 'evBdT'~fj,oveiv (virtutes omnes Jinem hahere beaiitvdinem) it is called in the account of the Stoa by Stobaeus (Eel., L. ii. c. 7, p. 114, and also p. 138).

Yet the ethics of Stoicism teach that happiness can only be attained with certainty through inward peace and quiShe^Jo! spirit (aTa^|^a), 'ahff*l^^ . ihis only be reached through virtue ; this is the whole meaning of the saying that virtue is the highest good.

But if indeed by degrees the end is lost siglit of in the means, and virtue is inculcated in a way which discloses an interest entirely different from that of one’s own happiness, for it contradicts this too distinctly ; this is just one of those inconsistencies by means of which, in every system, the immediately known, or, as it is called, felt truth leads us back to the right way in defiance of syllogistic reasoning ; as, for example, we see clearly in the ethical teaching of Spinoza, which deduces a pure doctrine of virtue from the egoistical siium utile queer ere by means of palpable sophisms.

According to this, as I conceive the spirit of the Stoical ethics, their source lies in the question whether the great prerogative of man, reason, which, by means of planned action and its results, relieves life and its burdens so much, might not also be capable of freeing him at once, directly, i.e., through mere knowledge, completely, or nearly so, of^.the sorrows and miseries of evejy kind of which his life is full.

They held that it was not in keeping with the prerogative of reason that the nature given with it, which by means of it comprehends and contemplates an infinity of things and circumstances, should yet, through the present, and the accidents that can be contained in the few years of a life that is short.

fleeting, and uncertain, be exposed to such intense pain, to such great anxiety and suffering, as wise from the tempestuous stra^ of the desires and the antipathies ; andjt^y Jbeliaved. that the due^appjigitipn pl reason must raise men above them, and can make them invulnefaBI^^^Therelore'Antisthenes says : Aei tcraaOai, vow, rj fipo-)(ov (aut meniem parandam, aut laqueum. Pint, de stoic, repugn., c.

14), i.e., life is so full of troubles and vexations, that one must either rise above it by means of corrected^ thoughts, or leave it. It was seen that want and suffering did not directly and of necessity spring Erom not having, but from desiring to have and not having ; that therefore this desire to have is the necessary condition under which alone it becomes a privation not to have and begets pain.

Ov irevta \inr7}v epya^erai, aXXa e-rrcOupLia {non paupertas dolorem ejjicit, sed cupiditas), Epict., fragm. 25.

Men learned also from experience that it is only the hope of what is claimed that_ begets and nourishes the wish ; therefore neither the many unavoidabfe evils which are common to all, nor unattainable blessings, disquiet or trouble us, but only the trifling more or less of those things which we can avoid or attain ; indeed, not only what is absolutely unavoidable or unattainable^, but also what is merely relatively so, leaves us quite undisturbed; therefore the ills that have once become joined to our individuality, or the good things tESt'must of necessity always be denied us, are treated with indifference, in accordance with the peculiarity of human nature that every wish soon dies and can no more beget pain rr it is not nourished by hopa It followed from all this that happiness always depends upon the proportion between our claims and what we receive.

It is all one whether the quantities thus related be great or small, and the proportion can be established just as well by diminishing the amount of the first as by increasing the amount of the second ; and in the same way it also follows that all suffering proceeds from the want of proTHE WORLD AS IDEA.

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portion between what we demand and erpect and what we get. Now this want of proportion obviously lies only in knowledge, and it could be entirely abolished through fuller insig^ht.^ Therefore Chrydppus says: fpv KaT (fiTreipiav tojv <pvaei avfifiaivovTav (Stob. Eel., L. ii c. 7, p. 134), that is, one ought to live with a due knowledge of the transitory nature of the things of th( world. For as often as a man loses self-command, or is, struck down by a misfortune, or grows angry, or becomes faint-hearted, he shows that he finds things different from what he expected, conseqiuently that he was caught in error, and did not know the world and life, did not know that the will of the individual is crossed at every stg} by the chance of inanimate nature and the antagonism of aims arid~fh"e wickedness oT otheF individuals : he has therefore either not made use of his reason in order to arrive"liI”"a“gehcrH knowledge of this chafacteristic'dr life, or he lacks judgment, in that he does not recognise in tlm particular what he knows in general, and is therefore surprised by it and loses his self-command.* Thus also every keen pleasure is an error a.nd an illusion, for no a,ttained wish can give lasting satisfaction; and, moveover, every possession and every happiness is but lent by chance for an uncertain time, and may therefore be demanded back the next hour, pain rests on the passing away of such an illusion ; thus both arise from defective knowledge ; the wise marTthefefore holds himself equally aloof from joy and sonw, and no event disturbs his arapa^ca.

In accordance with this spirit and aim of the Stoa, Epictetus began arid ended with the doctrine as the kernel