The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

thoughtfulness which distinguishes bis consciousness so entirely from that of the lower animals, and through which his whole behaviour upon earth is so different from that of his irrational fellow-creatures. He far surpasses them in power and also in suffering.

Thejy live in the present alone, he lives also in the future and the past. iTiey satisfy the needs of the moment, he provides by the most ingenious preparations for the future, yea for days that he shall never see. They are entirely dependcmt on the impression of the moment, on the effect of the perceptible motive ; he is determined by abstract conceptions independent of the present.

Therefore he follows predetermined plans, he acts from maxims, without reference to his surroundings or the accidental impression of the moment.

Thus, for example, he can make with composure deliberate preparations for his own death, he can dissemble past finding out, and can carry his secret with him to the grave ; lastly, he has an actual choice between several motives; for only in the abstract can such motives, pl-esent together in consciousness, afford the knowledge with regard to themselves, that the one excludes the other, and can thus measure themselves against each other with reference to their power over the wulL The motive that overcomes, in that it decides the question at issue, is the deliberate determinant of the will, and is a sure indication of its character.

The brute, on the other hand, is determined by the present impression j only the fear of present compulsion can constrain its desires, until at last this fear has become custom, and as such continues to determine it ; this is called training. Idie brute feels and perceives ; man, in addition to this, thinks and knows : both will.

The brute expresses its feelings and dispositions by gestures and sounds ; man communicates his thought to others, or, if he wishes, he conceals it, by means of speech. Speech is the first production, and also the necessary organ of hia reason. Therefore in Greek and Italian, speech and

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THE WORLD AS IDEA.

reason are expressed by the same word ; o \o«yo?, il discorso. Vernunft is derived from veiinehmen, which is not a synonym for the verb to hear, but signifies the consciousness of the meaning of thoughts communicated in words. It is by the help of language alone th^ reason accomplishes its most important achievementej— the united action of several individuals, the planned co-operation of many thousands, civilisation, the state; also science, the storing up of experience, the uniting of common propertios in one concept, the communication of truth, the spread of error, thoughts and poems, dogmas and superstitions. The brute first knows <^ath when it dies, but man draws consciously nearer to it every hour that he lives ; and this makes life at times a (questionable good even to him who has not recognised this character of constant annihilation in the whole of life. Principally on this account man has philosophies and religions, though it is uncertain whether the qualities we admire most in his conduct, voluntary rectitude and nobility of feeling, were ever the fruit of either of them. As results which certainly belong only to them, and as productions of reason in this sphere, we may refer to the marvellous and monstrous opinions of philosophers of various schools, and the extraordinary and sometimes cruel customs of the priests of different religions.

It is the universal opinion of all times and of all nations that these manifold and far-reaching achievements spring from a common principle, from that peculiar intellectual power which belongs distinctively to man and which has been called reason, () Xo<yo9, to XoyKjTiKov, TO Xoyifiov, ratio. Besides this, no one finds any difficulty in recognising the manifestations of this faculty, and in saying what is rational and what is irrational, where reason appears as distinguished from the other faculties and qualities of man, or lastly, in pointing out what, on account of the want of reason, we must never expect even from the most sensible brute. The philosoTUB IVORLD AS IDEA.

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