The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

Open to allVarious; see each volume782 segments · 261 pp

The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.

page 34

The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.

phers of all ages may be said to be on the whole at one about this general knowledge of reason, and they have also given prominence to several very important manifestations of it; such as, tlie control of the emotions and passions, the capacity for drawing conclusions and formulating general principles, even such as are true prior to all experience, and so forth.

Still all their explanations of the peculiar nature of reason are wavering, not clearly defined, discursive, without unity and concentration ; now laying stress on one manifestation, now on another, and tlierefore often at variance with each other. Besides this, many start from the opposition between reason and revelation, a distinction which is unknown to philosophy, and which only increases confusion.

It is very remarkable that up till now no philosopher has referred these manifold expressions of reason to one simple function which would be recognised in them all, from which they would all be explained, and which would therefore constitute the real inner nature of reason.

It is true that the excellent Locke in the “Essay on the Human Understan^pg” (Book II., ch. xl, §§ I o and 1 1 ), very rightly refers to general concepts as the characteristic which distinguishes man from the brutes, and Leibnitz quotes this with full s^proval in the “ Nouveaux Essais sur I’Entendement Humaine ” (Book IL,ch. xi., S§ lo and 1 1.) But when Locke (in Book IV., ch. xvii., §1 2 and 3) comes to the special explanation of reason he entirely loses sight of this simple, primary characteristic, and he also falls into a wavering, undetermined, incomplete account of mangled and derivative mahilesKtrons of it.

Leibnitz also, in the corresponding part of his work, behaves in a similar manner, only with more confusion and indistinctness. In the Appendix, I have fully considered how Kant conlused^and falsified the conception of the nature of reason. But whoever win take the trouble to go through in this reference the mass of philosophical writing which has appeared since

p. 50

THE WORLD .15 IDEA.

Kant, will find out, ^at just as the faults of princes must be expiated by whole natipns,^ the errors of great minds extend their influence over whole generations, arid even over centuries ; they grow and propagate themselves, and finally degenerate into monstrosities. All this arises from the fact that, as Berkeley says, “Few men ^ink ; yet all will have opinio^”

The understanding has only one function — ^immediate knowledge of the relation of cause and eflect. Yet the perception of the real world, and all common sense, sagacity, and inventiveness, however multifarious theii applications may be, are quite clearly seen to be no* thing more than manifestations of that one function. Sc also the reason has one fuaction ; and from it all the manifestations of reason we have mentioned, which distinguish the life of man from that of the brutes, rnaj easily be explained. The application or the non-application of this function is all that is meant by whal men have everywhere and always called rational anc irrational.^

§ 9. Concepts form a distinct class of ideas, existing only in the mind of man, and entirely different from the ideas of perception which we have considered up til now. We can therefore never attain to a sensuous and properly speaking, evident knowledge of their nature but only to a knowledge which is abstract and discursive It would, therefore, be absurd to demand that they shouh be verified in experience, if by experience is meant the real external world, which consists of ideas of perception or that they should be brought before the eyes or th( imagination like objects of perception. They can onlj be thought, not perceived, and only the effects whicl men accomplish through them are properly objects of experience. Such effects are language, preconceived anc planned action and science, and all that results from these

^ Compare with this paragraph §§ essay on the principle of sufficien 26 and 27 of the third edition of the reason.

THE WORLD IDEA.

5*

Commentary
page 34 ·

No commentary for this page under the selected tracks.

There is commentary on page 1.