The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

The common mortal, that manufacture of Nature which she produces by the thousand every day, is, as we have said, not capable, at least not continuously so, of observation that in every sense is wholly disinterested, as sensuous contemplation, strictly so called, is. He can turn his attention to things only so far as they have some relation to his will, however indirect it may be. Since in this respect, which never demands anything but the knowledge of relations, the abstract conception of the thing is sufficient, and for the most part even better adapted for use; toe ordinary man does not linger long over the mere perception, does not fix his attention long on one olyect, but in all that is presented to him hastily seeks merely the concept under which it is to be brought.

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as the lazy man seeks a chair^ and then it interests him no furSier^ This is why he is so soon_ done with everyffiing, with works of art, objects of natural beauty^, and iudee3~e\^y where with the truly significant contenaplation of all the scenes^of life^ He does not linger ; only seeks to know his own way in life, together with all that might at any time become his way.

Thus he makes topographical notes in the widest sense; wer tlie consideration of life itself as such he waatt^'s no time.

The man of genius, on the other hand, whose excessive power of knowleii^e frees it at "times from the service of will, dwells on the consideration of life itself, strives to comprehend the Idea of each thing, hot iti" relations to other things; and in (Mng_this he often forgets t(^consider his own path in life, and therefore for the most part pursues it awkwardly enough, "^ile to the ordinary man his faculty of knowledge is a lamp to lighten his path, to the man of_ gerilus" Tt”is ' the s"un which reveals ' tlieTworld.

This^eat diversity in their way of looking at life soon becomes visible in the outward appearance both of the man of genius and of the ordinary mortal. The man in '^om genius lives and works is easily distinguishednjy his glance, which is both keen and steady j and Bears the stamp of perception, of contemplation. This is e^iiy seen from the hkenesses of the few men of genius whom Nature has produced here and there among countless millions.

OC the other hand, in the case of an ordinary man, the true object of his contemplation, what he is prying into, can be easily seen from his glance, if indeed it is not quite stupid and vacant, as is generally the case.

Therefore the expression of genius ia a face consists in^ffii^ that in it a decided predominance of knowledge over will is visible^ and _coasejquai3yfly__^^ also shows itself in it aTEnowledge that is entirely devoid of relation to wiU, i.e., fure Ictifiwmg. On the contrary, in ordinary countenances there is a predominant expression of wUl; and we see that knowledge only comes into activity under

Since the knowledge that pertains to genius, or the knowledge of Ideas, is that knowledge which does not follow the principle of sufficient reason, so, on the other hand, the knowledge which does follow that principle is that which gives us prudence and rationality in life, and which creates the sciences. Thus men of genius are affected with the deficiencies entailed in the neglect of tliis latter kind of knowledge.

Yet what I say in this regard is subject to the limitation that it only concerns them in so far as and while they are actually engaged in that kind of knowledge which is peculiar to genius ; and this is by no means at every moment of their lives, for the great though spontaneous exertion which is demanded for the comprehension of Ideas free from will must necessarily relax, and there are long intervals during wEiSi men of genius are placed in very much the same position as ordinary mortals, both as regards advantages and defi^hcies.

On this account the action of genius has always been regarded as an inspiration, as indeed the name indicates, as the action of a superhuman being distinct from the individual himself, and which takes jiossession of him only periodically.

The disinclination of men of genius to direct their attention to the content oTlHe principle of sufficient ri^son will first show itself, with regard to the ground of being, as dislike of mathematics; for its procedure is based upon the most universal form3"’bf the phenomenon space and time, which are themselves merely modes of the principle of sufficient reason, and is consequently precisely the opposite of that method of thought which seeks merely the content of the phenomenon, the Idea which expresses itself in it apart from all relations. The logical method of mathematics Ts 'hTsb”ahtag^ to genius, for it does not