The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

1 Omnes perturbationes judicio avdpiairoL^ vavTtjv rtav KaKtatf^ ro rat censent fieri et opinione. Cic. TrpoX7)\//iis ras Koivas pirj tvvaadai Tusc., 4, 6. Tapaaaei tovs avOpujirovs €(pappLo^€Lu ran eiri piepovs (Hsbc ov ra TTpaypara, aWa ra irepi twv est causa mortalibus omnium mavpaypidTiav doypcLra (Perturbant lorum, non posse communes notiones homines non res ipsae, sed de rebus aptare singularibus). Epict. dissert.^ opiniones). Epictet., c. v. ii., 26.

^ Touro yap eerrt to aiTiop tois

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of his philosophy, that we sho^d consider well and (Jii:; tmguish whaj^ depei^s upon us and what does not, and therefore entirely avoid counting upon the latter, whereby we shaP^certainly remain free from ^ pain, sorrow, and anxiety. But that which alone is dependent upon u^ is the will ; and^ere a transition gradually takes place _to a doctrine of virtue, for it is observed that as the outer world, which is independent of us, determines good and bad fortune, so inner contentment with ourselves, or the absence of it^ proceeds from the will. But it was then asked whether we ought to apply the words bonum and malum to the two former or to the two latter 1 This was indeed arbitrary and a matter of choice, and did not make any real difference, but yet the Stoics disputed everlastingly with the Peripatetics and Epicureans about it, and amused themselves with the inadmissible comparison of two entirely incommensurable quantities, and the antithetical, paradoxical judgments which proceeded from them, and which they flung at each other. The Paradqxa of Cicero afford us an interesting collection of these from^he^ Stoical side..

Zeno, the founder, seems originally to have followed a somewhat different path. The starting-point with him was that for the attainment of the highest good, i,e., blessedness and spiritual peace, one must live in harmony with oneself (6fMo\oyovfiev(o<i tovto S’e<rT* Kaff iva \oyov xai avfi^wvov ^'pv. — Consonanter vivere : hoe est secundum unam rationem et concordem sibi vivere. Stob. Eel. eth. L. ii, a 7, p. 132. Also: Aperrtv Siadeaiv eivat <TVfi<f)a)vov eavrp irepi 6\ov rov fiiov. Virtutem esse animi affectionem secum per totam vitam amsentientem, ibid., p. 104.) Now this was only possible for a man if he determined himself entirely rationally, according^ to concepts, not according to changing impressions and moods ; since, however, only the maxims of our conduct, not the consequence^ nor the outward circumstances, are in our power.~in order teXe always consistent jye mniFsetii8 THE WORLD .45 IDEA. before us as our aim only the maxuiM and not the consequences and circumstance^ and thi^ again a doctrine of virtue is introduced.

But the ethical principle of Zeno — to live in harmony with oneself — appeared even to his immediate successors to be too formal and empty. They therefore gave it material content by the addition — “ to live in harmony with nature ” (p/ju)\oyov/ieva)^ ry ^i/)7~wffich, “as

Stobffius mentions in another place, was first added by Kleanthes, and extended the matter very much on account of the wide sphere of the concept and the vagueness of the expression. For Kleanthes meant the whole of nature in general, while Chrysippus meant human nature in particular (Diog. Laert., 7, 89). It followed that what alone was adapted to the latter was virtue, just as the satisfaction of animal desires was adapted to animal natures ; and thus ethics had again to be forcibly united to a doctrine of virtue, and in some way or other established through physics. For the Stoics always aimed at unity of principle, as for them God and the world were not dissevered.

The ethical system of Stoicism, regarded as a whole, is in fact a very valuable and estimable attempt to use the great prerogative of man, reason, for an important and salutary end ; to raise him above the suffering and pain to which all hfe is exposed, by means of a maxim —

Qva ratione queas traducere leniter (zvum :

Ne te semper inops agitet vexetque cvjddo^

Ne i}avor et rerum mediocriter utilium

and thus to make him partake, in the highest degree, of the dignity which belongs to him as a rational being, as distinguished from the brutes; a dignity of which, in this sense at any rate, we can speak, though not in any other. It is a consequence of my view of the ethical system of Stoicism that it must be explained at the part of my work at which I consider what

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