The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
^ Observe, in passing, that what cal significance of action cannot be gives every positive system of reli- explained in accordance with the gion its great strength, the point of principle of sufficient reason, yet contact through wffiich it takes pos- since every mythus follows this prinsession of the soul, is entirely its ciple, believers regard the ethical ethical side. Not, however, the ethi- significance of action as quite insecal side directly as such, but as it parable, and indeed as absolutely appears firmly united and inter- identical, and regard every attack woven with the element of mythical upon the mythus as an attack upon dogma which is present in every right and virtue. This goes so far system of religion, and as intelligible that among monotheistic nations only by means of this. So much is atheism or godlessness has become this the case, that although the ethi- synonymous with the absence of allp. 467 trary, virtue will show itself, not as a striving after happiness, that is, well-being and life, but as an effort in quite an opposite direction.
It follows from what has been said above, that the good is, according to its concept, rcav Trpu><i ti ; thus every good is essentially relative, for its being consists in its relation to a desiring will Absolute good is, therefore, a contradiction in terms ; highest good, minimum bonum, really signifies the same thing — a final satisfaction of the will, after which no new desire could arise, — a last motive, the attainment of which would afford enduring satisfaction of the will.
But, according to the investigations which have already been" conducted in this~Tourtifi Book, such a consummation is not even thinkable. The will can just as’^tle cease finm^winTTig altogether on account of some particularfi^tisf^tion^a^Jaine can end or bgj^ ; for it there is no such thing as a permanent fulfilment which shall completiry and for ever satisfy its craving.
It is the vessel of the Danaides; for it there is no highest gobdrno absolute ^op^ bj^t always^a _inerelj temppracy good.
If, however, we wish to give an honorary position, as it were emeritus, to an old expression, which from custom we do not like to discard altogether, we may, metaphorically and figuratively, call the complete selfeffacement and denial of the will, the true absence of will, which alone for ever stills and silences its struggle, alone gives that contentment which can never again be disturbed, alone redeems the world, and which we shall now soon consider at the close of our whole investigation — the morality. To the priests such con- in their history), which, according fusions of conceptions are welcome, to the latest and most authentic and only in consequence of them accounts, in Madrid alone (in the could that horrible monstrosity fana- rest of Spain there were many more ticism arise and govern, not merely such ecclesiastical dens of mursingle individuals who happen to be derers) in 300 years put 3CX),ooG specially perverse and bad, but whole human beings to a painful death at nations, and finally embody itself in the stake on theological grounds — a the Western world as the Inquisi- fact of which every zealot ought to tion (to the honour of mankind be it be reminded whenever he begins to said that this only happened once make himself heard.
p. 468
THE WORLD WILL.
BK. ly
absolute good, the summutn bonum — and regard it as the only radical cure of the disease of which all other means are only palliations or anodynes. In this sense the Greek reXof and also Jinis bonorum correspond to the thing still better. So much for the words good and bad ; now for the thing itself.
No commentary for this page under the selected tracks.
There is commentary on page 1.