The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

The motive in general stands before the will in protean forma It constantly promises complete satisfaction, the quenching of the thirst of will. But whenever it is attained it at once appears in another form, and thus influences the will anew, always according to the degree of the intensity of this will, and its relation to knowledge which are revealed as empirical character, in these very examples and instancea

From the first appearance of consciousness, a man finds himself a willing being, and as a rule, his knowledge remains in constant relation to his will. He first seeks to know thoroughly the objects of his desire, and then the means of attaining them. Now he knows what he has to do, and, as a rule, he does not strive after otlier knowledge. He moves and acts ; his consciousness keeps him always working directly and actively towards the aims of his will ; his thought is concerned with the choice of motives. Such is life for almost all men ; they wishj they. Imow whaTtKey wish,~ahdr fhey strive after it][ with sufficient success to keep them from despair, and sufficient failure to keep them from ennui and its conscquences. From this proceeds a certain serenity, or at least indifference, which cannot be affected by wealtF of poyer§n*"^3lL.^.i?k.. the poor do not enjoy what they have, for this, as we have shown, acts in a purely ncffl^e wayPBub' tiiey hope to attain to by their efforts. They press forward with much earnestness, and indeed with an air of importance ; thus children also pursue their play. It is always an exception if such a life suffers interruption from the fact that either the aesthetic demand for contemplation or the ethical demand for renunciation proceed from a knowledge which is independent of the service of the will, and directed to the nature of the world in general Most men are pursued by want all through life, without ever being allowed to come to their senses. On the other hand, the will is often inflamed to a degree that far transcends the assertion of the

p. 423

body, and then violent emotions and powerful passions show tEeraselves," in wluchjthe individual not only asse^ his 6wn”Sciitehce, but denies and^seelfOo so^presB^at of^hers wTien iriitands in hi? way. ^ .

The maintenance^dfthe body through its own powers is so small a degree of the assertion of will, that if it voluntarily remains at this degree, we might assume that, with the death of this bc^y, the will also which appeared in it woiilcnie extinguished. But even the satisfaction of~ the sexual passions goes beyond the assertion of one’s own existence, which fills so short a time, and asserts life for an indefinite time after the death of the individual. Nature, always true and consistent, here even naive, exhibits to us openly the inner significance of the act of generation. Our own consciousness, the intensity of the impulse, teaches us that in this act the most decided assertion of the will to live expresses itself, pure and without further addition (any denial of other individuals) ; and now, as the consequence of this act, a new life appears in time and the causal series, i.e., in nature ; the begotten appears before the begetter, different as regards tbe phenomenon, but in himself, i.e., according to the Idea, identical with him. Therefore it is this act through which every species oi living creature binds itself to a whole and is perpetuated. Generation is, with reference to the begetter, only the expression, the symptom, of his decided assertion of the will to live : with reference to the begotten, it is not the cause of the will which appears in him, for tlie will in itself knows neither cause nor effect, but, like all causes, it is merely the occasional cause of the phenomenal appearance of this will at this time in this