The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

full consciousness be completely himself, and will never fail himself at the critical moment, because he win^ways"T^^ himself. He will often enjoy the satisfaction of feeling his strengtH^l^n^, spldoOL .experience the gain of^^befhg reminded of his weakness. The latter is mortiiicatibn, wETcTi causes perhaps the greatest of mental sufferings ; tlmrefore it is Jar more endurable to have~our misfortune brought clearly before us than our incapacity. And, further, iF we are tliiis ‘fTHry^acqualnferm^ strength and our weal^^ss, we will not attempt to make a show 2with base coin, for all such dissimulation misses the mark in the end. For since the whole man is only the phenomenon of his will, nothing can be more perverse than to try, by means of reflection, to become something else than one is, for this is a direct contradiction of the will with itself. The imitation of the _gualities and idiosyncrasies of others is much more shameful tha^ to dress in^ other £eogle’s_^ clothes ; for it is the judgment of our own worthlessness pronounced bj ourselves. Knowledge of our j)wn mind and its capacities of evCTj kind^ and their unalterable limits, is in this respect the surest way t^e at^nmen£ of the greatest possible contentment with ourselves. For it holds good of inward as of outward circumstances that there is for us no consolation so effective as the complete certainty of unalterable necessity. Ko evil that befalls us pains us so much as the thought of the circumstances by which it might have been warded off. Therefore nothing co inlets us so effectually as the consideration of what has happened from the standpoint of necessity, from which all accidents appear as tools in the hand of an overruling fate, and we therefore recognise the evil that has come to us as inevitably produced by the conflict of inner and outer circumstances ; in other words, fatalism. We really only complain and storm so long as we hope

either to affect others or to excite ourselves to unheardof efforts. But children and grown-up people know very well to yield contentedly as soon as they clearly see that it absolutely cannot be otherwise ; — Ovfiov ew iXTiqOecrat Saficurain-e^ ax^icq (Animo in pcctoribv* 3nostro domito necessitate. We are like the entrapped elephants, that rage and struggle for many days, till they see that it is useless, and then suddenly offer their heclci quietly to the yoke, tamed for_ ever. ^WeTaife TSKe iCing David, wh^ as long as his son still lived, unceasfh^y importuheff Jehovah with prayers, and" hefiaved himself as if in despair; hut as soon as his son was dead, thought no longer about it. Hence it arises that innumera]^ permanent His, such" as lameness, poverty^ low ugliness, a disagreeaBT^dwellin^i^ce, are borne with indiBerence by innumerable peradhs^land^are' no "long^^ felt, iike healed wounds, jiist beCatiS'e these 'persons know that inward or outward necessity rehdera it impossible that any change can take place in these things ; while those who are more fortunate cannot understand how such misfortunes can be borne. Kow as with outward necessityj^sF 8dso^^h'~inwâd ; nothing reconciles so thoroughly as a distinct knowledge of it. If we have once for all distinctly recognised not only our good qualities and our strength, but also our defects and weakness, established our aim accordingly, and rest ^tisfied concerhih'g what^cahnbt be” attained,' we thus escape in the surest way, as farli^ur indrvIduaTT^ permits, the bitterest of all sorrows, discontentment with ourselves, which islbEe~ThevItabre result 6r~ignoiahce~bI our own individuality, of falie conceit and the audacity that proceeds from^it. To the bitter chapter of the self-knowledge here recommended the lines of Ovid admit of excellent application —

^ Optimus tile animi vindex ladentia pectuif Vincula qui rupit^ dedoluUque semeV