The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp

^ 1 am all the more delighted and varias^ quibus mundl hujus visihilU astonished, forty yearjs after I so struct ura forniusa est^ senticndas timidly and hesitatingly advanced sensibus praelent ; ut^ pro eo quod this thought, to discover that it NOSSE non poasunt^ quasi innoteshas already been expressed by St. OERE veils videantur, — De civ, Dei^ Augustine ; Arbuata formas suaa xi^ 27.

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greatness; if, nevertheless, the beholder does not direct his attention to this eminently hostile relation to his will, but, although perceiving and recognising it, turns consciously away from it, forcibly detaches himself from his will and its relations, and, giving himself up entirely to knowledge, quietly contemplates those very objects that are so terrible to the will, comprehends only their Idea, which is foreign to all relation, so that he lingers gladly over its contemplation, and is thereby raised above himself, his person, his will, and all will : — in^ that case he is filled with the sense of the suhlime, he is in the state of spiritual exaltation, and therefore the object producing such a state is called sublime.

Thus what distinguishes the sense of the sublime from that of the beautiful is this : in the case of the beautiful, pure knowledge has gained the upper hand without a struggle, for the beauty of the object, i.e., that property which facilitates the knowledge of its Idea, has removed from consciousness without resistance, and therefore imperceptibly, the will and the knowledge of relations which is subject to it, so that what is left is the pure subject of knowledge without even a remembrance of will.

On the other hand, in the case of the sublime that state of pure knowledge is only attained by a conscious and forcible breaking away from the relations of the same object to the will, which are recognised as unfavourable, by a free and conscious transcending of the will and the knowledge related to it.

This exaltation must not only be consciously won, but also consciously retained, and it is therefore accompanied by a constant remembrance of will ; yet not of a single particular volition, such as fear or desire, but of human volition in general, so far as it is universally expressed in its objectivity the human body. If a single real act of will were to come into consciousness, through actual personal pressure and danger from the object, then the individual will thus actually influenced would at once

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THE WORLD AS IDEA.

6K. Ill,