The World as Will and Idea, Vol. I — Arthur Schopenhauer, trans. Haldane & Kemp
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The translator’s English as printed (R. B. Haldane & J. Kemp). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
principal distinction between man and the brute, which has scarcely more than the character of the species, is conditioned by the choice between several motives, which is only possible through abstract conceptions.
For only after a choice has been made are the resolutions, which vary in different individuals, an indication of the individual character which is different in each; while the action of the brute depends only upon the presence or absence of the impression, supposing this impression to be in general a motive for its species.
And, finally, in the case of man, only the resolve, and not the mere wish, is a valid indication of his character both for himself and for others ; but the resolve becomes for himself, as for others, a certain fact only through the deed.
The wsh is merely the necessary consequence of the preset impression, whether of the outward stinmlus, or the inward passing mood ; and is therefore as immediately necessary and devoid of^ consideratmn m the action of the hrutes.
Therefore, like the action of the hrutes, it merely expresses the character of the species, not that of the individual, i.e., it indicates merely what vnan in general, not what the individual who experiences the wish, is capable of doing.
The deed alone, — because as human action it always requires a certain deliberation, and because as a rule a man has command of his reason, is considerate, i.e., decides in accordance with considered and abstract motives, — is the expression of the intelligible maxims of his conduct, the result of his inmost willing, and is related as a letter to the word that stands for his empirical character, itself merely the temporal expression of his intelligible character.
In a healthy niind, therefore, only deeds oppress the conscience, not wishes and th^ghts; for it is only our deeds that holdf lip to ui" the mirror oiP our will The deed li'eIerre(l"to ahoi^ that is entirely unconsidered and is really commit ted in blind passion, ib to a certain extent an intermediate thing between the naer^ wish and the resolve.
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THE WORLD AS WILL.
BK. IV.
Therefore, by true repentance, which, however, shows itself as action also, it can be obliterated, as a falsely drawn line, from that picture of our will which our course of life is. T may insert the remark here, as a very good comparison that the relation between_wish_and deed has a purely accidental but accurate analogy with that between the accumulation and discharge of electricity.
“the " result of the whole of this discussion of the freedom of the will and what relates to it, we find that although the will may, in itself and apart from the phenomenon, be called free and even omnipotent, yet in its particular phenomena enlightened by knowledge, as in men and brutes, it is determined by motives to which the special character regularly and necessarily responds, and always in the same way. We see that because of the possession on his part of abstract or rational knowledge, man, as distinguished from the brutes, has a choice, which only makes him the scene of the conflict of his motives, without withdrawing him from their control. This choice is therefore certainly the condition of the possibility of the complete expression of the individual character, but is by no means to be regarded as freedom of the particular volition, i.e., independence of the law of causality, the necessity of which extends to man as to every other phenomenon. Thus the difference between human volition and that of the brutes, which is introduced by reason or knowledge through concepts, extends to the point we have indicated, and no farther. But, what is quite a different thing, there may arise a phenomenon of the human will which is quite impossible in the brute creation, if man altogether lays aside the knowledge of particular things as such which is subordinate to the principle of sufficient reason, and by means of his knowledge of the Ideas sees through the principium individuationii. Then an actual appearance of the real freedom of the will as a thing-in-itself is possible, by which the phenomenon comes into a sort of contradiction with
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