The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

Accordingly his version is uniformly supported scholiastarum suffragiis. Thus in the S. Bhdshya, as we have seen, the passage is explained, drishté sd apdrthd chét évam manyasé na éhdnta, &e.; ‘If by reason of there being obvious remedies, you think indeed the inquiry superfluous, no (it is not so), from their not being absolute and permanent.’ So in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi, after stating the objection at length, the commentator adds, nirdkaroti, na iti; ‘(the author) refutes it (by saying), no, not so:’ kutah, ‘why’ ékdntatyantatoh abhdvdt +. The S. Chandrikd is to the same effect, or still more explicit: ‘ There being obvious means, the inquiry is superfluous, the conclusion being otherwise attained : if (this be urged) such is the meaning (of the text), (the author) contradicts it; no, it is not sof. This commentator giving the very reading, drishié sati, which Professor Lassen argues Mr. Colebrooke’s version would erronesaris ttierata mitwatste wd eeUace H a & A +a af. 6 t freradtfn Afa i Fa | Gera t eB afa en fraren sath serarfrerediia Sierra: 1 fatwa Afi e ap. 8 ously require. The remaining scholiast, Rima Krisuna, adopts the comment of the Chandriké word for word, and consequently the commentators are unanimous in support of the translation of Mr. Colebrooke.

With respect to the passages referred to by Professor Lassen as establishing the connexion of the negative with the latter member of the sentence, instead of its being absolute, it will be seen at once that they are not at all analogous to the passage in our text. They are declaratory, not argumentative; and the terms following the negative particle are the parts or circumstances of the negative, not the reasons on which it is grounded. Thus in the [Zitopadesa : ‘ What will not be, will not be; if it will be, it will not be otherwise *.’ So in v. 8. of the Kérikd: ‘The non-apprehension of nature is from its subtlety, not from its nonentity+.’ In neither of these is there any reference to a foregone position which must be admitted or denied, nor is the negative followed by the reasons for denial, as is the case in our text.

These considerations are more than sufficient to vindicate, what it was scarcely perhaps necessary to have asserted, Mr. Colebrooke’s accuracy ; and they are now also somewhat superfluous, as I have been given to understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of his interpretation. The commentary of GaurapApa distinctly shews that nothing more is intended by the text, than the unprofitableness of recourse to visible or worldly expedients for the relief or removal of worldly pain. In subjoining therefore the gloss of VAcHespatt Misra, with a translation, it is intended rather to illustrate the doctrines of the text, and the mode of their development by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the correctness of the translation.

‘ {But verily the object of the science may not need inquiry, 1. if there be no pain in the world; 2. if there be no desire to avoid it; 3. if there be no means of extirpating it. The impossibility of extirpating it is

* zenfs a marfa freee | | t areearwequesfar aera |} wa fe a wrefaact freer afe gd ATA sorta a ea | ar a fered | feria erratN ASE |p. 9 twofold ; either from the eternity of pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviation: or, though it be possible to extirpate pain, yet that knowledge which philosophy treats of may not be the means of its removal ; or again, there may be some other and more ready means. In the text, however, it is not said that pain does not exist, nor that there is no wish to avoid it. From the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain.—A triad of pain, three kinds: they are the ddhydtmika, ‘natural ;’ ddhibhautika, ‘extrinsic; and ddhidaivika, ‘superhuman. The first is of two kinds, bodily and mental: bodily is caused by disorder of the humours, wind, bile, and phlegm; mental is occasioned by desire, wrath, covetousness, fear, envy, grief, and want of discrimination. These various kinds of pain are called inseparable, from their admitting of internal remedies. The pain that requires external remedies is also twofold, ddhibautika and ddhidaivika. The first has for its cause, man, beasts, deer, birds, reptiles, and inanimate things; the second arises from the evil influence of the planets, or possession by impure spirits (Yakshas, Rdkshasas, Vindyakas, &c.). These kinds of pain, depending upon the vicissitudes arising from the quality of foulness, are to be experienced by every individual, and cannot be prevented. Through the obstruction occasioned by the three kinds of pain abiding in spirit, arises embarrassment, or

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