The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
But in respect of an unseen one, the functions of the three are preceded by that of the fourth,— Unseen implies time past, or future; for instance, in respect to ‘ form,’ the function of the eye has preceded that of intellect, egotism, and mind, as has that of the skin in respect to touch; of the nose in regard to smell; of the ear in relation to sound; and of the tongue in respect to taste. The functions of intellect, egotism, and mind are preceded in order by those of the senses in regard to time future or past, whilst in regard to time present they may be either instantaneous or gradual. Further—
COMMENT.
The consentaneous or successive operation of the three internal and any one of the external organs in the formation of ideas is here described.
The cooperation of the three internal organs and any organ of sense may be instantancous (yngapat), like a flash of lightning, or as at the sight of a tiger, when the recognition of him, knowledge of his ferocity, conclusion of personal peril, and determination to try to escape are the business of one and the same moment: or their operation may be gradual or successive (kramasas), allowing leisure, for instance, for the eye to sce, for the mind to consider, for egotism to apply, and for intellect to conclude. Gavurapapa rather disarranges the order of succession, and places the function of egotism last, assigning to it the office of belief or conviction. VActhespati's illustration is more regular: ‘Thus, the ear
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hears the twang of a bowstring; mind reflects that this must be for the flight of an arrow; egotism says, It is aimed at me; and intellect determines, I must run away *.. Whenever the object is unseen, adrishia, not present, whether it be past or be to come, there must have been a prior perception of it; that is, as the text is explained by the commentators, there must have been a prior perception of it by an organ of sense. The expression of the text, tat pirvikd vritti, ‘their prior function,’ might be thought to refer to a prior notion gained by the conjoint operation of the internal and external organs at some former period. This, however, would be recollection, the seat of which, as well as of judgment or inference, is in buddhi, or ‘intellect,’ alone; as in the Pdtanjala Sitra, ‘ Proof, refutation deliberation, sleep, memory ; these are said to be the functions of intellect ¢.’ The prior operation, therefore, is merely perception or observation by the external sense, alochanam (see ver. 28), conveying simple ideas to the mind. Taking, then, this prior simple idea acquired through an external organ, any further consideration of it is the gradual operation of the three internal instruments. Where the object is present, conviction may be either momentary or successive: the Sankhyas maintaining the possibility of conseutaneous operation of the organs of sense and mind, egotism and intellect, in opposition to the doctrine of the Vaiséshikas, that the formation of ideas is in all cases a graduated process: Where the object is absent, the idea must be formed by the internal organs so far in successive order that they must be consequent upon a former impression received by an external sense ; but as concerns themselves, their action may be either simultaneous or hansacihd The
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illustration which occurs in the Bhdshya and other commentaries, of the course of reasoning by which the nature of a distant object is determined, is something like that with which, in the Philebus, the formation of opinion is elucidated.
XXNI.
Tue instruments perform their respective functions, incited by inutual invitation. ‘The soul's purpose is the motive: an instrument is wrought by none. : BHASHYA.
Steam is repeated, implying ‘several order :’ that is, intellect, egotism, mind, perform their respective functions, the incitement to which is mutual invitation. Advita implies ‘respect and alertness.’ They do this for the accomplishment of the purpose of soul. Egotism and the rest effecting it through intellect : that is, intellect, knowing the wishes of egotism and the rest, proceeds to its own peculiar function. If it be asked, why it does so? the answer is, the purpose of the soul is the motive. Soul's purpose is to be fulfilled: for this object the activity of the qualities occurs, and thence these instruments make manifest the object of the soul. How is it that (being devoid of intelligence) they act? They act of their own accord. An instrument can be wrought by none—The purpose of soul alone causes them to act: this is the meaning of the sentence: an instrument is not made—not roused—to act by any human superior.
It is next specified how many (instruments) intellect and the rest are.
COMMENT.
The circumstances that induce the internal and external orgaus to perform their respective functions are said to be mutual incitement, and spontaneous disposition to effect the objects of soul.