The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

tion;’ as in the Hitopadésa, ‘the crow,’ Laghupatanaka, says, ‘All has been heard by me; and this is my resolve, that we must be friends *.’ And Menu: ‘ Desire is the root of expectation ; sacrifice is its product :’ or, a8 Kututxa Buatta explains it, ‘ Sankalpa is understanding to this effect, that by a certain ceremony a desired consequence is effected t.’ In both passages the notion of ‘conclusion from foregone premises’ is conveyed, and that seems to be its meaning here. Thus VAcuespati explains it: ‘The mind carefully considers a substance perceived by an organ of sense, (and determines) this is simple, that is not so; or discriminates them by their condition of predicate and predicable||.’ Again, it is said, “ First, knowledge or perception is simple (inconsiderate), like the knowledge of a child, a dumb man, or the like: it is produced by the mere thing; but when, after this, the thing, as distinguished by its properties, by its genus, and the like, is recognised by the understanding, and intellect is in accordance with perception, that period (or interval) of determination is the operation of the mind.” Here, then, sankalpa is the process of reflection, the consideration of the object of simple perception, so as to form a definite idea, which mind transmits, through individuality and intellect, to soul. In this way mind is an organ both of perception and action; perceiving the objects presented by the senses, and forming them into a positive idea. It is further identified with both classes of organs by originating from the same source, egotism affected by goodness; and consequently it consists of the same material §.

The second portion of the stanza conveys a doctrine that is not very intelligible. The variety of the senses and of the objects of the senses is

“qa aan at meri Saray Aer ae Aes a wii | ft deere: wat Saar deereer: | waa water eqfae wes Brom eae fare af: awe: | sar aifeafafgie afaefate anpuacss Aafaft wary wT @ aneg |p. 99 said to arise spontaneously in them, from specific modification of the three qualities. VAcnespatt understands the allusion to external objects to be merely illustrative ; that is, the internal organs are diversified by modification of the qualities, in the same manner that external objects are varied by the same modification*:’ and the translation follows this explanation. In the Bhdshya a different reading in the original occurred, which would require the passage to be rendered, ‘and from variety of external objects ¢:’ thus ascribing the diversity of the organs, not only to modification of the qualities, but to the diversity of external objects, which require suitable, and therefore various organs for their apprehension. The reading is, however, clearly incompatible with his argument, although GaurapApa is somewhat obscure; but the variety is noticed and admitted by the author of the Chandrika}.

The S. Pravachana Bhdshya considers the multifariousness spoken of in theSAtra, which conveys apparently a similar doctrine to that of the Kdrikd, as restricted to mind : ‘ Multifariousness is from modification of qualities, as the variety of human condition (is from various association): that is, as the very same individual assumes different characters, according to the influence of his associations; becoming a lover with a mistress, a sage with sages, a different person with others; so mind, from its connection with the eye or any other organ, becomes identified with it, and consequently is diversified according to the function of sight and the rest of the organs with which it is severally associated |... The association of mind with the organs is intimated by the Védas, as in the text,‘ My mind was elsewhere, I did not hear j.’ The very illustration used i Locke:

+ aredierifin vemenit aw arecerer treet | tan were) bh arenterafirns q orentereditfeate arauret are eet: | | qeafeannreraranreay | We Ta au araaraae aad aha anqar facmarfarcetss anrert vq ash weeny aAQUEsraa atafeghe fafrern areata t | § srearraar sera ararafafi

p. 100

“A man whose mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, takes no notice of impressions made by sounding bodies upon the organ of hearing: therefore it is evident that perception is only when the mind receives the impression,” says the English philosopher; and the Hindu infers, that ‘the mind must cooperate with the organs of sense, even for perception, as they would otherwise be incapable of performing their functions *.”

The materiality of mind, considered as distinct from consciousness, intelligence, and soul, and as neither more nor less than an internal sense, a sensorium, is much less absurd than the same character of it when considered as part of, or identical with, soul, as was the doctrine of the Epicureans, whose description of mind, as an organ merely, agrees well enough with the Hindu notion: