The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

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not objects of sense, and are to be known only by reasoning from analogy. For as the predicates Mahat and the rest have the three qualities, so must that of which they are effects, the chief one (nature), have the three qualities; and as that which is irrational appears as if it was rational, it must have a guide and superintendent, which is soul. That which is perceptible is known by perception; but that which is imperceptible, and which is not to be inferred from analogy, must be learnt from revelation, as, Ixpea, the king of the gods; the northern Kurus; the nymphs of heaven: these depend upon sacred authority. Here some one objects, Nature or soul is not apprehended, and what is not apprehended in this world does not exist; therefore these two are not, any more than a second head, or a third arm. In reply it is stated, that there are cight causes which prevent the apprehension of existing things.

COMMENT.

In this verse, according to the translation followed, the application of the three different kinds of proof to three different objects is described : according to a different version, only one class of objects is referred to, those which transcend the senses, and of which a knowledge is attainable only by inference from analogy, or by revelation.

The S. Tatwa Kaumudi concurs with the 8S. Bhdshya in understanding the terms of the text, sdmdnyato drishtdt®, to refer to anumédnat {, intending ‘inference from analogy}. A similar explanation occurs in the S. Pravachana Bhashya: ‘ Thence, from reasoning by analogy, the determination of both, of nature and soul, is effected j.. It appears therefore that in this place the text does not refer cither to perception or to inference in gencral, as evidence of perceptible things, but solely to inferencep. 27 from analogy, as proof of imperceptible objects. For inference a priori or a posteriori regards things not necessarily beyond the cognizance of the senses, like nature and soul, but those only which are not at the moment perceptible, as fire from smoke, rain from floods or clouds, and the like. It might be preferable, therefore, to render the verse somewhat differently from the text, or, ‘It is by reasoning from analogy that belief in things beyond the senses is attained; and imperceptible things, not thereby determined, are to be known only from revelation.’ The version of Mr. Colebrooke, in which he is followed by Professor Lassen (‘« Equalitatis intellectus est per perceptionem : rerum que: supra sensus sunt per demonstrationem vel hac non evictum, quod preter sensus est, probatur revelatione”), rests apparently upon the authority of the S. Chandrikd and S. Kaumudi. ‘ Sdmdnyatas has the affix tasi in the sense of the sixth (possessive) case. The ascertainment of all objects appreciable by the senses, whether actually perceived or not, is by perception: therefore knowledge of earth and the other elements is by sense; but knowledge of things beyond the senses, as nature and the rest, is from inference *.’

When inference from analogy fails, then, according to all the authorities, the remaining proof, or revelation, must be had recourse to, agreeably to the Sftras; ‘Oral proof is fit instruction,’ and ‘fit instruction is communication of the proofs by which the nature of both prakriti and purusha may be discriminated +.”

VIL.

From various causes things may be imperceptible (or unperceived); excessive distance, (extreme) nearness, defect of the organs, inattenp. 28tion, minuteness, interposition of objects, predominance of other matters, and intermixture with the like.

BHASHYA.

Non-perception of things here existing may proceed from, their remoteness, a8 of Vishnumitra, Maitra, and Chaitra, dwelling in different countries; or their propinquity, as the eye does not see the collyrium applied to the eyelids; from defect of the organs, as sound and form are undiscernible by the deaf and the blind; from inattention, as a person whose thoughts are distracted does not apprehend what is said to him, however intelligibly ; from minuteness, as the small particles of frost, vapour, and smoke in the atmosphere are not perceived ; from interposition, a8 a thing hidden by a wall; from predominance of others, as the planets, asterisins, and stars are invisible when their rays are overpowered by those of the sun; from ixtermizture with the like, a3 a bean in a heap of beans, a lotus amongst lotuses, a myrobalan amongst myrobalans, a pigeon in a flock of pigeons, cannot be perceived, being confounded in the midst of similar objects. In this way non-perception of actually existing things is cightfold.