The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

Lastly, like is produced from like. Such as is the character of cause, in which effect exists, such also is the character of effect; as, barley is produced from barley, rice from rice. If effect was not (did not pre-exist), then rice might grow from pease ; but it does not, and therefore effect is.

By these five arguments, then, it is proved that intellect and the other

K

3+ characteristics do (pre)exist in nature; and therefore production is of that which is, and not of that which is not.

COMMENT. .

Arguinents are here udduced to shew that the effects or products of nature are comprised in, and coexistent with, their cause or source ; consequently they are proofs of the existence of that primary cause or source.

Tt is laid down as a general principle, that cause and effect are in all cases coexistent, or that cffect exists anteriorly to its manifestation ; safkdryyam® in the text meaning ‘existent effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause {;’ or, as the phrase also of the text asadukarandt { is explained, ‘If effect prior to the exercise of (efficient) cause does not exist, its existence cannot by any means be effected |.’ The expression sat-karyyam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as meaning ‘ existent effect,’ not the effect of that which exists: and the object of the stanza is to establish the existence of canse from its ctlects, and not of effects from the existence of cause, as Professor Lassen has explained it: * Quwnam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur mentem cetcraque principia effecta esse are ov.” Mons. Pauthier (Traduction de la Siinkhya Karikd, 105) is more correct in his view of the general purport of the verse; Ce qui i existe pas ne peut arriver 4 Vétat deffet ;° but he has mistaken the particulars—the reasons why that which is not can never be, for the means which would be fruitlessly exercised for its production : it is not that such existence cannot be effected “ par la co-opération d'aucune cause matériclle,” &c., but because an effect requires an adequate material cause, and the like.

"arerg, ot arerg ore arc@erorarfefe: ) faa ceca | wea ICT OF wa aT a HTD aq TA |

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Not only has the meaning of this verse been misapprehended by its translators, but the doctrine which it conveys seems to have becn somewhat misconceived by high authority. M. Cousin, referring to this passage, observes, “ L'argumentation de Kapila est, dans l'histoire de philosophie, l'antécédent de celle d’Enésidéme et Hume. Selon Kapila il n'y a pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous appelons une cause n'est qu’une cause-apparente relativement 4 l'effet qui la suit, mais c'est aussi un effet relativement 4 la cause qui la précéde, laquelle est encore un effet par la méme raison, et toujours de méme, de manitre que tout est un enchainement necessaire d’effets sans cause véritable et indépendente.” M. Cousin then supports his view of the doctrine by selecting some of the arguments contained in the text ; as,‘ That which does not exist cannot be made to exist ;” and, “ Cause and effect are of the same nature :": and he adds, as a third, that “il ne faut pas s’occuper des causes, mais des effets, car l’existence de l'effet mesure I'¢nergie de la cause; donc leffet équivaut la cause.” In this instance, however, he is scarcely justified by his authority, whose object is not to dispense with the consideration of cause altogether, but to prove its existence from that of its effects. Kapila, therefore, is far from asserting that “il n'y a pas de cause,” although he may so far agree with the philosophers referred to, in recognising no difference between material cause and material effects: for it must be remembered, that it is of material effects, of substances, that he is speaking. His doctrine is, in fact, that on which Brown enlarges in his lectures on power, cause, and effect—that “the forms of a body are the body itself; and that all the substances which exist in the universe are every thing which truly exists in the universe, to which nothing can be added which is not itself a new substance: that there can be nothing in the events of nature, therefore, but the antecedents and consequents which are present in them; and that these accordingly, or nothing, are the very causes aud effects which we are desirous of investigating.” Lect. on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p.175. Kaviia, however, has not asserted a series of antecedents and consequents without beginning ; and whatever we may conceive of his mia-prakriti, his original and unoriginated substance whence all substances proceed, it is a fixed point

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