The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

The terms prfti and apriti are here used as synonymes of sukha, ‘ pleasure,’ and dukha, ‘ pain ;’ rishdda as a synonyme of moha, ‘ bewilderment, stupefaction, dullness, or insensibility.” The composition of déma with these terns, pritydtmaka, implies ‘ essential or inseparable presence,’ like that of life or soul in the living body. An exact equivalent for such a compound can scarcely perhaps be supplied, but the sense may be conveyed by such expressions as ‘ consists of, comprehends, is one or idenp. 51tical with,’ and the like. A‘ma is here used also to shew that the properties have positive existence; that is, pleasure is not the mere absence of pain; pain is not the mere absence of pleasure ; as, ‘ Negatives could not be essential ingredients in any thing: pleasure, pain, and insensibility are therefore entities; the word d¢ma implying being, existence, existent nature, or property °.’

The absolute and relative influence of the several qualities is sufficiently illustrated by Gaurapapa; but VaAcnespati understands the text as in some respects differently constructed. Instead of considering the last term, vrittayat, as a distinct condition, anyonyavrittaya {, expounded in the S. Bhdshya, parasparam varttanté |, they are reciprocally present,’ he interprets vritti by Ariyd, ‘act, operation, function,’ and compounds it with eath of the foregoing terms {. In all other respects his explanation of the terms coincides with that of the elder commentator. The passage quoted by Gaurapdpa is cited by Vacnespatt, with some difference, from the Védas: ‘As it is said in the dgama, all universally present are the associates of each other: goodness is the partner of foulness, foulness of goodness; both are the companions of darkness, and darkness is said to be the associate of both. Their original connexion, or disjunction, is never observed.’ The Chandriké concurs with the S. Tatwa Kanmudi in the explanation of rritti**. This commentary likewise offers some additional interpretation of the terms priti, &c. Thus prité is said to ara | 1 faqaqeere | lerrrgea: | | avert awa Sara (gfe) areaftarat qaretenfinageat eee lela hg * waft a1 at arenas cae farad aa are Fag ce mmmerht PIEA H erect WH word: EET ud wa sea Saree: dan fara arrears)" aT wrae ofan a ayaa |p. 52 comprise ‘rectitude, gentleness, modesty, faith, patience, clemency, wisdom :’ apriti, besides ‘ misery,’ implies ‘ hatred, violence, envy, abuse, wickedness :' and vishdda is not only ‘insensibility,’ but ‘ tardiness, fear, infidelity, dishonesty, avarice, and ignorance. Whenever either of these is observed, it is referable to the corresponding quality *.”

In speaking of qualities, however, the term guna is not to be regarded as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the medium of the faculties. It is, in fact, nature, or prakriti, in one of its three constituent parts or conditions, unduly prominent; nature entire, or unmodified, being nothing more than the three qualities in equipoise, according to the Sittra, ‘ Prakriti is the equal state of goodness, foulness, and darkness {:’ on which the commentator remarks, ‘ Satwa and the rest are “things,” not specific properties, from their being subject to combination or disjunction, and from their having the properties of lightness, heaviness, and strength }:’ and again, ‘ From the construction of intellect and the rest endowed with the three properties, like cords wherewith to bind the victim the soul.’ So in the S.Sdra, ‘Goodness and the rest are not the faculties of that (prakriti), being of the same nature 4'—' Such expressions as “ qualities of nature” are to be understood (in the same sense) as (the term) “ the trees of a forest”': that is, the forest is nothing different from the trees of which it is the aggregate, although particular trees or clumps may sometimes be indivi-

“are aif: geyrcemientyee eee agree cerfe aed q aaer gen ef Arai

p. 53