Wilson stops on the word the translation turns on. Lassen's Latin "procreatriz" is set aside because it conveys "too much the idea of personality"; matter, Wilson grants, is "the correct equivalent"; yet he keeps Colebrooke's nature, because it names both parent and progeny and is "the constant subject of prosopopeia". The last reason decides the matter for this book. Its closing stanzas could not be said of matter: prakriti is a dancer who withdraws once seen, a generous benefactor of an ungrateful soul, a bashful being that will not be looked at twice. A reader should hear in nature, throughout, an uncaused and unconscious material principle, and take the person the similes give it as figure, which is how Wilson's own comment on the last of these verses reads it.
The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)
The text is shown on its own: no facing layer is held for this issue.
The translator’s English as printed (H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.
Now what is to be considered as the sense of these words? By what equivalent is prakriti to be best rendered? Professor Lassen translates it procreatriz, but this seems to convey too much the idea of personality, and therefore, although very well agreeing with the original term as used by the Pauraniks, where prakriti is commonly personified, yet it can fa frente ptt bagfi: aReca murererere wat AT aisfrerarea: IR: Weira: |p. 82 scarcely be considered as indicative of that which not only produces, but is the thing produced, being at once the origin and substance of all things. Mr. Colebrooke has rendered the term sometimes by ‘nature,’ nud sometimes by ‘matter :’ the former expresses both the parent and the progeny, and agrees in being also the constant subject of prosopopeia. It is therefore preferable to perhaps any synonyme that the English language can offer, At the same time the correct equivalent is ‘ matter,’ materia, quasi mater, * the substance and source of material things ;’ not, however, crude, visible, or divisible matter, but that first principle of the Pythuygoreans and Platonists, and of Aristotle, which having neither purts, nor form, or sense, nor quantity, nor any of the properties of body, was yet the one universal, incorporeal, invisible substance from which all bodies were derived. Ais 3} tiv 105 -yeryordros Oparod cai wavres alalgrad pyrepa nai Oxodoyny wire "yiv ware dépa pire zip wire Ddwp Neyouer, wire Gan dx podrae ware cE By raira yéyover, GX’ dvoparoy eidds te cai Gpoppov wav- Hc. Tins, See also the Physics, b. III. c.6, That we are to underatuud this of the prakriti of the Sankhyas is evident from the meaning of itm neverul nppellations. It is also said by Visnina Burxsnu, that ‘the watld is merely modification of form, of which prakriti is the materiuly *' ‘tt is not individual or formal, but universal material t? S. Pr. Udbivhys Vt» invisibility is, as we have seen (ver.8, p. 29), attributed, not to iia won existence, but to its subtilty (saukshmya). Prakriti is also defined ‘the equilibrium of the three qualities {;) and here it differs from the suhjeot mutter of Aristotle in having qualities. These qualities, however, wlilet prude is yet unevolved, neutralize each other, and are scarcely qualities ua regards primary nature, because their loss of equilibrium, or their wetivity, is concurrent with the discontinuance of prakriti as separate fon ita produete, So far, however, prakriti may be considered as differcut Home the brute matter of the ancient physiologists, that it produces
* afturnmred wreurertadt 7 waft: | + onfasi a Huai aitqrerd werd a afcfest arrafrerd: if eyeuetead |p. 83 products of its own energy or power for a special cause, and is therefore more akin to the “ plastic nature that acts, Zveca rov, for the sake of something.” In the Sénkhya system, however, such nature is not distinct from matter itself, whilst it appears to be a different principle in the writings of the Greek philosophers, although not always very intelligibly described ; for, as Cudworth observes of Aristotle, “ he nowhere declares of this nature of his, whether it be corporeal or incorporeal, substantial or accidental.” To conclude, we are to understand of the prakriti of the Sénkhyas, primary, subtile, universal substance, undergoing modification through its own energy, and for a special motive, by which it is manifest as individual and formal substance, varied according to the predominance of qualities, which are equipoised and inert in the parent, and unequal and active in the progeny.
XXIII.
AscertainMent is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse.
BHASHYA.
The definition of intellect is ascertainment. Ascertaining (discerning, determining) is ascertainment: as in the seed the future germinating shoot is contained, so is determination (in intellect). This is a jar, this is cloth: that intellect which will so determine is so defined. This intellect has eight members, according to the twofold affection of goodness and darkness. The first kind, or intellect, partuking of goodness, is of four kinds, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, power. Virtue comprises humanity, benevolence, and acts of restraint (yama) and of obligation (niyama), The former are said in the Pdtanjala to be, restraint of cruelty, of falsehood, of dishonesty, of incontinence, and of avarice: the latter are the obligations of purification, contentment, religious austerity, sacred study, and worship of God. Knowledge has for its synonymes, manifestation, cer-
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