The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

to the sixfold proof of an older scholiast or Vrittikdra, but those six proofs are, as Mr. Colebrooke states, perception, inference, comparison, presumption, authority, and privation; and the author of the Sdstra dipikd excludes expressly sambhava, pratibhd, and aitihya from the character of proofs. With regard to the terms specified, it may be doubted if exact equivalents can be devised. Arthdpatti is literally, ‘attainment of meaning ;’ conjecture or presumption, ‘inference; from which it differs only in the absence of the predicate or sign from which the subject is inferred. The illustrations of the commentator do not very clearly explain the purport of the two kinds of this proof, ‘seen’ and ‘heard.’ In the Sdstra dipikd the first is exemplified by the sentence, “ Devapatra is alive, but not in his house; it is presumed therefore that he is abroad.” ‘ Heard,’ sruta, is referred to the Védas, and applies to the interpretation of precepts by the spirit as well as the letter, as in a direction to offer any particular article, it may be presumed, that should that not be procurable, something similar may be substituted. VAcnespati also considers arthdpatti to be comprised in inference, as well as sambhava, ‘identity’ or ‘proportion.’ Privation, he argues, is only a modification of perception; and aitihya, or ‘report,’ is no proof at all, the person with whom it originates being undetermined. Pratibhd he does not mention. The concluding expressions of GaurapAva, Pratijdnvdsa sanjndnam, are of questionable import, and there is possibly some error in the copy. The

‘objects of proof,’ prameya, are, according to the Sankhyé4, all the principles of existence. Siddhi, ‘accomplishment, determination,’ in the last hemistich, is explained by pratiti, ‘ trust, belief.’

Vv.

Perception is ascertainment of particular objects. Inference, which is of three sorts, premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. Right affirmation is true revelation. G

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BHASHY A.

Drishia ‘secn,’ or pratyaksha, ‘ perception,’ is application or exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest, to sound, &c. Inference is of three kinds, subsequent, antecedent, analogous. Inference antecedent is that which has been previously deduced ; as, rain is inferred from the rising of a cloud, because formerly rain had been the consequence. Subsequent; as, having found a drop of water taken from the sea to be salt, the saltness of the rest also is inferred. Analogous ; as, having observed their change of place, it is concluded that the moon and stars are locomotive, like Cnaitea: that is, having seen a person named Cuartaa transfer his position from one place to another, and thence known that he was locomotive, it is inferred that the moon and stars also have motion (because it is seen that they change their places). So observing one mango tree in blossom, it is inferred that other mango trees also are in flower. This is inference from analogy.

Again ; premises an argument, and (deduces) that which is argued by it. That inference. Premises a prior argument; that is, the thing which has a predicate is inferred from the predicate, as, a mendicant (is known)

by his staff; or it premises the subject of the argument, when the predicate is deduced from that of which it is predicated, as, having seen a mendicant, you say, this is his triple staff. Rryht affirmation is true revelation.—Apta means dchdryas, ‘holy teachers,’ as Brahma and the rest. Srufi means ‘the Védas.” * Teachers and Védas’ is the import of the compound, and that which is declared by them is true revelation.

In this manner threefold proof has been described. It is next explained by what sort of proof ascertainment is to be effected, and of what objects.

COMMENT.

The three kinds of proof, perception, inference, and right affirmation,
are here more particularly explained.
The first is defined, ‘what severally relates to, or is engaged in, an

.

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object of sense*. Adhyavasdya is explained by VAcuespami, ‘ Knowledge, which is the exercise of the intellectual faculty}... NArdvana explains it, ‘That by which certainty is obtained{.’ The organs do not of themselves apprehend objects, but are merely the instruments by which they are approximated to the intellect: ‘neither does intellect apprehend them (rationally), being, as derived from (prakriti) matter, incapable of sense; but the unconscious impressions or modifications of intellect, derived through the senses, are communicated to soul, which, reflecting them whilst they are present in the intellect, appears by that reflection actually affected by wisdom, pleasure, and the like §.”