The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

Open to allIsvara Krishna; comm. Gaudapada273 segments · 92 pp

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The translator’s English as printed (H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson). The original-language text is not held; names are romanised as the translator printed them.

existent things) is described by its properties, and they are the same which are specified in the original Sitra. 1. Hétumat*, ‘having cause, or origin; Aetu implying ‘ material, efficient, and occasional cause ;’ 2. Anitya, ‘temporary ; for whatever has cause has beginning, and whatever has a beginning must have an end. At the same time this is to be understood of them in their actual or present form or condition: ‘Of their own nature (or as one with their cause) they are eternal, but they are perishable by their separate conditions{.’ So in the Sdtras ‘destruction’ is explained ‘ resolution into cause |.’ 3. ‘ Unpervading §:’ * Every one of the effects of nature is not observable in every thing, they are dispersed as different modifications.’ Vydpti is the essential and inherent presence of one thing in another, as of heat in fire, oil in sesamum, &c. 4, Sukriya**, ‘ mutable,’ or ‘having action :’ perhaps ‘movable’ or ‘migratory’ would perfectly express the sense; for the phrase is explained to signify that the effects of nature migrate from one substance to another: ‘Intellect and the rest leave one body in which they were combined, and enter into the composition of another: this is their transition: the transition of the gross elements earth and the rest, composing body, is well known ft.’ 5. ‘ Multitudinous:' many, anéka {{ being repeated in various objects and persons, as ‘the faculties in different individuals, and the elements in different forms.’ 6. Supported

‘earq) lo teafaa) 6 baer eran fara aearfafaariad FI lane @reareya: | § sranfa 1 * etafcarfa a amin ** afsed t t qereq sore woufters ofa: Naar llafrged qarétat Rem gfamrafa wittaerferea |p. 43 by, referable to, dsrita*; as an effect may be considered to be upheld by its cause, or an individual referable to a species; as trees form a wood.

7.‘ Mergent,’ dinga t; that which merges into, or is lost or resolved into, its primary elements, as subsequently explained. Intellect and the rest are the lingas, signs, marks, or characteristic circumstances of nature: and when they lose their individuality, or discrete existence, they may be said to have been absorbed by, or to have fused or merged into, their original source, Although, therefore, the application of dinga as an attributive in this sense is technical, the import is not so widely different from that of the substantive as might at first be imagined. VAcuespati, explaining the term, has, ‘ Linga, the characteristic of pradhdna, for these principles, buddhi and the rest, are its characteristics, as will be hereafter explained {:' and the author of the S. Chandrikd has, ‘ Linga is that which characterizes, or causes to be known |\;’ it is the anumdpuka 4, ‘the basis of the inference: ‘ For this effect (of nature) is the parent of the inference that an undiscrete cause exists‘.’ (See also Com. on v. 5. p. 24.) According to these interpretations, ‘ predicative’ or ‘ characteristic’ would perhaps be a preferable equivalent ; but ‘mergent’ or‘ dissoluble**’ is conformable to the S. Bhdshya. The commentator on the S. Pravachana explains it by both terms ‘inferential’ or ‘ resolvable :’ ‘ Effect is termed dinga, either from its being the ground of inference of cause, or from its progress to resolution ¢{.’ 8, ‘Combined, conjunct,’ sdvayava {}; explained by VAacnespati, ‘mixing,’ misrana ||||, or ‘junction,’ samyoga \§, a8 the elements combine with one another. It might be said, then, that nature is a compound, as its products combine with it; but this is not so, for their union with nature is not mere ‘ mixture or conjunction,

Serfar ot fan ot fet ere om a genes: mua forrqafcereenfa | \ feari fesrrafin areafis | § srqATTa | “wath fe anifad srcrersrmangfafit WAS I * UTR 1 SITAR TAATATT fari wa sri eraza ferry eta

p. 44

but identification from the sameness of the cause and effect ®:’ a notion which distinguishes the pradhdna of the Sénkhyas from the first principles of those Grecian philosophers, who, if their doctrines have been rightly represented, taught that substances existed either as distinct particles of an aggregate, or component parts of a mixture, in their original form. In the S4ukhya they separate or reunite as one and the same. 10. ‘Governed :’ the effects of nature depend upon its existence, and each in its turn produces its peculiar effect or product, in furtherance of the influence of nature, or in consequence of its existence, without which they would cease to be, and their effects would be null; as, ‘In the effect of egotism, which intellect has to produce, the fulfilment of nature is regarded ; otherwise intellect, being ineffective, would not be able to produce egotism {."

The properties of nature, or the undiserete principle, are the reverse of these ; it has no cause; it has no end; it is omnipresent; it is immutable; it is single; it is self-sustained; it is the subject, not the predicate; it is entire, or one whole; it is supreme.

Commentary
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There is commentary on pages 2, 42, 66, 84.