The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

The arguments in the text for the existence of soul are so many original aphorisms of Kapita; as, 1.‘ Soul is distinct from body, &c.}: 2.‘ From an aggregate being for another's use |):’ 3.‘ From (the properties of) soul being the converse of the three qualities, &c.§:' 4. ‘ From superintendence §:’ 5, ‘ From the tendency to abstraction **,’ The commeutator notices a different reading of the last Stra ‘ From nature not being competent to abstraction: but this he considers erroneous tt. The fifth book of the 8. Pravachana contains other Sitras affirmative of the separate existence of soul.

XVIIL.

Since birth, death, and the instruments of life are allotted severally ; since occupations are not at once universal; and since qualities affect variously ; multitude of souls is demonstrated.

BHASHYA.

Life and death, and the instruments (of life)—From the several allotment of these; this is the meaning of the text. Thus, if there was but one soul,

‘aera nedfet feat 4) Fret wrafaragey tomsye a gorda aarafa a fe generar: we enrrarfs arated wert) t eererairae: | arthorfearfafoe: gam! | deacorter: «9 farperfefacatars —S wefiy wrarefa | ” Saad awe | tt reared eRe: afa aware: ararfesareceretta: |

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then when one was born, all would be born; when one died, all would die; if there was any defect in the vital instruments of one, such as deafness, blindness, dumbness, mutilation, or lameness, then all would be blind, deaf, dumb, maimed, and halt: but this is not the case; and therefore, from the several apportionment of death, birth, and instruments of life, multiplicity of soul is demonstrated. Since occupations are not at once universal.— Yugapat means, ‘at one time.’ Not at once; or, at one time. Occupation: as engaging in acts of virtue and the like are not observed to occur at one moment; but some are busy with virtuous, others with vicious, actions; some cultivate indifference to the world, and some acquire true wisdom: therefore, from the non-contemporaneousness of occupation, multitude of souls is concluded. Also, since qualities affect variously.—From the contrary nature of the qualities multitude of souls is proved ; as, in birth in general, one endowed with the quality of goodness is happy; another with that of foulness is wretched ; and a third having that of darkness is apathetic: hence, therefore, multitude of souls is proved. Soul is not agent: this is next declared.

COMMENT.

The multitudinous existence of soul, or the individual incorporation of soul in different bodies, is here maintained.

Birth is defined to be the association of soul with body; death, its detachment: soul being always existent, and not in itself subject to birth or death; as in the S. Pravachana Bhdshya*: also the S. Tatwa Kaumudf ; * Life is the combination of soul with the pains incident to body, &c.; not any modification of soul. Death is the abandonment of those bodies, &c.; not the destruction of soul t.’ The instruments of life are aeaeatht: Gee WA A | TererafCara: | AaTAT tera aftart acd a art faare |

* THA we arafefaart qeafreapram ot Ree

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the organs of perception and action, with egotism and intellect. ‘ Allotment,’ niyama, properly ‘rule, regulation,’ is explained by vyavasthd, which may import ‘distribution ;’ as, ‘ The distribution is in regard to different souls in several bodies *:’ so also the Sfitra of Kariira; ‘ From the distribution of life, &c. follows the multitudinousness of soul ¢.”. The term is especially understood, however, of the distribution which is laid down by religious and legal authorities, ‘a prescribed distribution or allotment,’ as the commentator on the Sitra observes, after stating, ‘The virtuous man is happy in heaven,’ &c. (see p. 48), ‘Souls are many, as otherwise there would not be the occurrence of such division, or appointment of conditions, as is laid down in the Véda and the law {.’ If soul were one, all the accidents, vicissitudes, and interests of existence would simultaneously affect all individuals.

But though manifold, as individualized, this individual soul is one and unchanged, through all its migrations into various forms, until its final liberation. It is the disguise which is changed, not that which wears it, as has been before explained (p. 48). .