The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

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nature, from intellect to the special elements: that is, (the evolution) of intellect from nature; of egotism from intellect; of the rudiments and senses from egotism ; and of the gross elements from the subtile. Js performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively. —This evolution is effected for the liberation of each individual soul which has assumed body, whether brute, human, or divine. How (is it effected)? It is done Sor another's sake as for self: as, for instance, a person neglecting his own objects transacts those of a friend, so does nature ; soul makes no return tonature. As for self; not for self: for the sake, in fact, of another is the apprehension of sound and the other objects of sense, or knowledge of the difference between soul and qualities ; for souls are to be provided (by nature), in the three worlds, with objects of sense, and at last with liberation : such is the agency of nature ; as it is said, “ Nature is like a utensil, having fulfilled soul's object it ceases.”

It is here objected, Nature is irrational, Soul is rational ; then how can nature, like a rational thing, understand that by me, soul is to be provided in the three worlds with the objects of sense, and at last with liberation! This is true; but action and cessation of action are both observed in irrational things; whence it is said—

COMMENT.

The object of nature's activity is here said to be the final liberation of individual soul.

Nature is properly inert, and its activity, its “ motion” or evolution, takes place only for the purpose of soul, not for any object of its own. The term is drambha, ‘commencement,’ ‘ successive origin or beginning,’ as detailed in former passages: that is, of intellect from crude nature; of egotism from intellect ; and so on, This is the spontaneous act of nature: it is not influenced by any external intelligent principle, such as the Supreme Being or a subordinate agent; as Brana, it is without (external) cause*.’ ‘ But it is objected, Nature being eternal, her works

° wpa Hat Awa a welarerarerarea: |

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should be so too; and forms once evolved should therefore endure for ever. To this it is replied, The work is done for a special purpose, the liberation of individual soul; and that when this is accomplished, nature ceases with regard to that individual, as a man boiling rice for a meal desists when it is dressed {.” S. Tatwa Kaumudi. According to Gaura- PADA, and to the text of the following stanza, nature so acts spontaneously ; but the incompetency of nature, an irrational principle, to institute a course of action for a definite purpose, and the unfitness of rational soul to regulate the acts of an agent whose character it imperfectly apprehends, constitute a principal argument with the theistical Sankhyas for the necessity of a Providence, to whom the ends of existence are known, and by whom nature is guided, as stated by VAcuespatt: ‘ But whether this (evolution) be for its own purpose or that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character; therefore there is an omniscient Being, the director of nature, which is Iswara, or Godt.’ This is not inconsistent with the previous doctrine, that creation is the evolution of nature: it is so, but under the guidance of a ruling Power. The atheistical Sankhyas, on the other hand, contend that there is no occasion for a guiding Providence, but that the activity of nature, for the purpose of accomplishing soul’s object, is an intuitive necessity, as illustrated in the ensuing passage.

"amare vite ots ugfattenfaet fade wa wars Fens Arafaqage apis qed ateafe a af a qanrre 1 enemy Te GO aT ara: wate ay Wafacada fe qaefa werrefea wpacinenn Baa: at Aware Van why apfrafirengaeter tei agfrerearatraean | wearefea aint eat igacfinera Sur ef

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LVII.