The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

The multiplied existence of soul is in especial contradiction to the doctrine of the Védantis, of the universality of one supreme soul of the world, from which all human souls are derived, as in such texts as this; ‘One only existent soul is distributed in all beings; it is beheld collectively or dispersedly, like the reflection of the moon in still or troubled water. Soul, eterual, omnipresent, undisturbed, pure, one, is multiplied by the power of delusion, not of its own nature |.’ This is undoubtedly the doctrine of the Védas, and the Sankhya teachers, who profess to receive those works as authority, are obliged to interpret the texts wee lee wa fe geen age ye arafera: | wa aguT wa eran woaean | fae: winter Fen etrafeta: | ve: a fied me A A STAT |p. 71 unfavourable to their dogmas in a peculiar manner. Thus the Sétra of Kapiva asserts, ‘ There is no contradiction (to the doctrine of many souls) in the unity of the Védas, from its reference to the comprehensiveness of genus*:’ that is, Soul, considered as genus, is but one; its nature and properties are common to all souls, individualized and manifold in connection with individual aggregates of the products of nature. ‘Genus here means community, unity of nature; such is the purport of the unity of the Védas; not indivisibility, from the absence of any motive (for its continuing undivided). This is the meaning of the Sitra}.’ The subject is discussed at considerable length by VisnAna Buiksuv; but, notwithstanding his arguments, it is clear that the S4nkhya doctrine is contradictory to that of the Védas.

The doctrines of those Grecian philosophers, who maintained the immateriality and eternity of soul, conformed to that of the Védas. As far as we are able to learn of the doctrines of Pythagoras, he taught that human souls were portions of one supreme soul. Plato held the souls of men to be emanations from God, through the soul of the world. Souls and bodies were both portions of the 76 ¢v, the ‘one existent,’ of the Stoics; and even Aristotle appears to have conceived the human soul to be an intellectual energy, derived from an eternal intelligence. Cudworth asserts that none of the ancient philosophers maintained the Sankhya notion of the eternity of individual souls. “It doth not follow,” he remarks, “ because they held souls to be ingenerable, that therefore they supposed souls to have existed from all eternity of themselves unmade. This was never asserted by theist or atheist. The philosophic theists, who maintained @ternitatem animorum, did, notwithstanding, assert their essential dependence upon the Deity, like that of the lights upon the sun, as if they were a kind of eternal effulgency, emanation, or eradiation, from an eternal Sun.” Intell. Syst. 111. 429.

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XIX.
And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows, that soul is
witness, solitary, bystander, spectator, and passive.

BHASHYA.

And from that contrast: the contrast of the possession of the three qualities. Contrast: reverse. Soul is void of qualities, is discriminative, enjoyer, kc. The contrast is that presented by these attributes of soul ; and thence, the qualitics of goodness, foulness, and darkness being agents (active), tt follows that soul is (passive) witness, This sentence is syntactically connected with the preceding, regarding the multitudinousness of soul. The qualities, as agents, act; a witness neither acts nor desists from action. Again, adstraction (detachment) is an attribute (of soul); the property of being sole is detachment or abstraction, difference or distinctness (from all others); that is, it is distinct, or separate, from the three qualities. Next, being a bystander (is an attribute of soul): the condition of a middle man (or looker-on, or neutral). Soul is a bystander, like a wandering mendicant: as a vagrant ascetic is lonely and unconcerned, whilst the villagers are busily engaged in agriculture, so soul does not act where the qualities are present. Hence also proceed the properties of being a spectator and passive. From being a bystander, soul is a spectator, and is not a performer of those acts (which it contemplates). The three qualities, goodness, foulness, and darkness, engage in acts in the relation of agent and act; not soul: and in this manner the existence of soul is demonstrated.

But if soul is a non-agent, how does it exercise volition? as, I will practise virtue, I will not cominit crime: here soul must be the agent; for if soul is not the agent (then these purposes cannot be entertained This is a dilemma: to explain which it is said—

COMMENT.