The Sānkhya Kārikā, with the Bhāshya of Gauḍapāda — trans. H. T. Colebrooke and H. H. Wilson (1837)

of pain. In this place the three sorts of pain are, 1. (ddhydtmika) natural and inseparable ; 2. (ddhibhantika) natural and extrinsic; and 3. (ddhidaivika) non-natural or superhuman. The first is of two kinds, corporeal and mental: corporeal is flux, fever, or the like, arising from disorder of the wind, bile, or phlegm; mental is privation of what is liked, approximation of what is disliked. Extrinsic but natural pain is fourfold, according to the aggregation of clementary matter whence it originates ; that is, it is produced by any created beings, whether viviparous, oviparous, generated by heat and moisture, or springing from the soil; or in short, by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles, gnats, musquitoes, lice, bugs, fish, alligators, sharks, trees, stones, &c. The third kind of pain may be called superhuman, daivika meaning cither divine or atmospheric : in the latter case it means pain which proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, and the like.

Where then, or into what, is inquiry, in consequence of the embarrassment of the three kinds of pain, to be made! Jnto the means of precluding them. This is the inquiry. Nor is the inquiry superfluous. That is; if this inquiry be (regarded as) superfluous, the means of precluding the three sorts of pain being obvious (seen); as for example; the internal means of alleviating the two inseparable kinds of pain are obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, bitter, and astringent decoctions, or through the removal of those objects that are disliked, and accession of those that are liked; so the obvious obstruction of pain from natural causes is protection and the like; and these means being obvious, any (farther) inquiry is superfluous: if you think in this manner, it is not so; for absolute, certain, final, permanent, obstruction (of pain) is not (to be effected) by obvious means. Therefore inquiry is to be made by the wise elsewhere, or into means of prevention which are absolute and final.

COMMENT.
The first verse of the Kérika proposes the subject of the work, and

not only of that, but of the system to which it belongs, and of every philosophical system studied by the Hindus; the common end of whichp. 3 is, ascertainment of the means by which perpetual exemption from the metempsychosis, or from the necessity of repeated births, may be attained: for life is uniformly regarded by the Hindus as a condition of pain and suffering, as a state of bondage and evil; escape from which finally and for ever is a consummation devoutly to be wished.

The liberation thus proposed as the object of rational existence cannot be attained as long as man is subject to the ordinary infirmities of his nature, and the accidents of his condition: and the primary object of philosophical inquiry therefore is, the means by which the imperfections flesh is heir to may be obviated or removed. As preparatory then to their right determination, it is first shewn in the text what means are not conducive to this end; such, namely, as obvious but temporary expedients, whether physical or moral.

Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first number of his Gymnosophista, containing the translation of the Kériké, has given a version differing in some respects from Mr. Colebrooke’s. He thus renders it: “ E tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur desiderium cognoscend@ rationis, qua ii depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet in visibilibus rebus infructuose versetur, non est (infructuosum) propter absentiam absoluti, et omni evo superstitis remedii.”